Addressing Micronutrient Deficiencies in Central Asia by unknown
ADB  
NUTRITION  
AND  
DEVELOPMENT 
SERIES No. 8
Satisfying 
Hidden Hunger
Addressing Micronutrient Deficiencies in Central Asia
f
dd
Satisfying 
Hidden Hunger
Addressing Micronutrient Deficiencies in Central Asia
© Asian Development Bank 2010.
All rights reserved. Published 2010.
Printed in the Philippines.
ISBN 978-92-9092-008-3
Publication Stock No. RPT101339
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
 Satisfying hidden hunger: Addressing Micronutrient Deﬁciencies in Central Asia.  
Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2010.
1. Food.  2. Health.  3. Nutrition.  4. Central Asia.  I. Asian Development Bank. 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views and 
policies of ADB or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent.
ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences 
of their use.
By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in 
this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
Note: In this report, “$” refers to US dollars. 
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
Tel +63 2 632 4444
Fax +63 2 636 2444
www.adb.org
For orders, please contact: 
Department of External Relations
Fax +63 2 636 2648
adbpub@adb.org 
THE ADB NUTRITION AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES
The ADB Nutrition and Development Series began in 2001 and covers 
the impact of malnutrition on poverty and depressed human and 
economic development in Asia and the Paciﬁc. The series stresses three 
themes: targeting nutrition improvements at poor women and children, 
with beneﬁts to families, communities, and nations throughout the life 
cycle; reviewing and applying scientiﬁc evidence about nutrition impact 
for policies, programs, and development assistance that will raise the 
quality of human resources; and creating opportunities for public, 
private, and civil sector partnerships that can raise the dietary quality 
of the poor and enhance the learning and future earning capability 
of poor children. The series is intended for ADB member countries, 
development partners, and scholars interested in applying science and 
technology to investment decisions.
Contents
Foreword   
Xianbin Yao, Director General, Regional Sustainable Development Department,  
 Asian Development Bank v
Nevin S. Scrimshaw, Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachussetts Institute of  Technology;  
 President, International Nutrition Foundation; Visiting Professor, Tufts University vii
Acknowledgments   ix
Abbreviations   xii
Executive Summary   xiii
1. Background 1
Central Asia’s Micronutrient Deﬁciencies 1 
ADB’s Involvement with Food Fortiﬁcation 3
2. The Regional Fortiﬁcation Initiative   5
Objectives and Strategies   5
Scope of the Initiative   6
Alliance Building   8
Implementation Arrangements   9
Achievements of the Initiative   9
Fortiﬁcation   9
Private Sector Investment   16
Legal and Regulatory Framework   16
Advocacy, Communication, and Mobilization   18
Capacity Development   19
3. Development Impact   23
Reduced Prevalence of Iodine Deﬁciency and Iron Deﬁciency   23
4. Development Issues, Lessons Learned, and Conclusion   29
Development Issues   29
Lessons   32
Conclusion   34
Next Steps   35
Appendixes
1. History of Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia before the Initiative   37
2. Almaty Declaration, 2001   44
3. Regional Workshops under the Initiative   47
4. Performance Indicators of the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Projects   48
5. Legislation and Regulations on Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asian Countries   49
6. Declaration of the Third Almaty Forum, 2007   57
iv Satisfying Hidden Hunger: Addressing Micronutrient Deficiencies in Central Asia
Tables
1.1: Prevalence of Goiter among Children in Central Asia and Mongolia   1
1.2: Anemia Prevalence in Central Asia and Mongolia   2
2.1:  Physical Inputs for Salt Iodization in the First Japan Fund for 
 Poverty Reduction Project, by Country   7
2.2: Ingredients of KAP Komplex 1   12
3.1: Estimated Impact of Iodization on Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders Prevention   23
3.2:  Urinary Iodine Measurements in Children 2–15 Years of Age 
 and Women 15–49 Years of Age, by Country   25
3.3: Anemia, Ferritin, and Folic Acid Measurements in Children and Women, by Country   27
A1.1:  Summary of National Iodine and Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders 
 Elimination Policy and Program Status, 2000   40
A1.2: Wheat Production and Flour Consumption in Central Asia and Mongolia   42
Figures
2.2:  Annual Iodized Salt Production as Percentage of Annual Salt Consumption 
 in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007   10
2.3:  Percentage of Households Using Iodized Salt in Central Asia and Mongolia 
 in 1995–2006 Compared to World Averages   10
2.4:  Annual Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour Production as Percentage of Annual 
 Wheat Flour Consumption in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007   12
2.5: Number of Participating Flour Mills in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007   13
2.6:  Pan American Health Organization Guidelines on Quality Assurance 
 and Control for Food Fortiﬁcation.   14
2.7:  Share of Grant and Private Industry Costs of Iodized Salt Production 
 in Central Asia and Mongolia in 2001–2007   16
2.8:  Numbers of Salt Engineers and Laboratory Technicians Trained in Central Asia 
 and Mongolia, 2003–2007   21
2.9:  Numbers of Flour Mill Engineers and Laboratory Technicians Trained 
 in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007   21
2.10: Numbers of Staff of Control Agencies Trained in Central Asia and Mongolia 
 in 2003–2007   22
3.1:  Number of Newborns Protected Each Year against the Risk of Brain 
 Damage from Iodine Deﬁciency, 2000–2006   24
Boxes
2.1: Kazakhstan’s Successful Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders Awareness Campaign   19
2.2: Opposition to Mandatory Flour Fortiﬁcation   20
Foreword
Malnutrition and micronutrient deﬁciencies are causes and a consequence of poverty. The consequences of 
chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deﬁciencies, beginning with women and their young children, are 
intergenerational and account for a large proportion of child and maternal deaths, mental disability, and 
less productivity of the workforce.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and the International Food Policy Research Institute, conducted a comprehensive assessment 
of nutrition in Asia in the last decade. It determined that food fortiﬁcation is one of the most cost-effective 
strategies that can lift the tremendous human and economic burden of micronutrient deﬁciencies and 
malnutrition in Asia. 
The beginning of ADB’s active involvement in nutrition in 1999 led to a series of studies and a landmark 
conference, Strategies to Fortify Essential Foods in Asia and the Paciﬁc (Manila Forum 2000), the reports 
of which were published by ADB in its Nutrition and Development Series. The studies led to projects in 
Central Asia and Mongolia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Viet Nam.
During 2001–2007, ADB led an initiative in Central Asia and Mongolia, described in this report, to 
address the growing and urgent problem of disease occurrence due to micronutrient deﬁciencies in the 
region. The initiative consisted of two sequential projects: the ﬁrst, a pilot intervention to fortify two staple 
foods, salt and wheat ﬂour; and the second, a series of activities to broaden and institutionalize mandatory 
fortiﬁcation of these foods across the region. 
Food fortiﬁcation, as a means to deliver essential nutrients to the poor and vulnerable, also deserves 
renewed attention as ADB seeks to strengthen its assistance in achieving food security in the region. We 
hope this monograph on the results of the 7-year-long initiative presents evidence that food fortiﬁcation 
indeed works, and that collective efforts by the government, the private sector, and civil society can mitigate 
debilitating micronutrient deﬁciencies in a relatively short period. The monograph also shares the challenges 
in and lessons learned from expanding food fortiﬁcation, in the hope of beneﬁting ongoing and future food 
fortiﬁcation projects in whatever small way it can.
Xianbin Yao
Director General
Regional Sustainable Development Department
Asian Development Bank
Foreword
In temperate zones of industrialized countries, soil, water, and food tend to be deﬁcient in iodine, and 
populations are frequently deﬁcient in this essential mineral. Iodine deﬁciency during pregnancy lowers 
the distribution of IQ scores of offspring. Iron deﬁciency is common in low-income populations, mainly 
because iron is poorly available in the predominantly cereal diet they can afford. Pregnant women and 
young children are those most vulnerable to iron deﬁciency. Infants of iron-deﬁcient mothers have lower 
iron stores at birth and are at greater risk of developing iron deﬁciency anemia and impaired cognition. 
Folic acid deﬁciency in early pregnancy increases the occurrence of congenital defects of the spinal cord.
In any country, people who do not consume a diet providing sufﬁcient available dietary iron and essential 
B vitamins suffer serious health consequences from deﬁciencies of these nutrients. Most industrialized and 
many developing countries rely on salt fortiﬁed with iodine, and cereal ﬂours to which thiamine, riboﬂavin, 
niacin, and iron have been added. The former Soviet Union’s centralized health system provided these 
measures for its citizens, but with its breakup in 1991, these vital measures were discontinued in most of 
the newly independent countries. When iodization of salt stopped, iodine deﬁciency and goiter returned. 
Poor economic conditions and deteriorating health services led to an increase in iron deﬁciency anemia and 
low vitamin intakes in some sectors of the population.
This was the situation in the ﬁve countries of Central Asia plus Mongolia in 2001 when Joseph 
Hunt, then senior health and nutrition economist at the Asian Development Bank (ADB), initiated the 
ADB project ﬁnanced by a grant from the Japanese Fund for Poverty Reduction. Initially planned for the 
iodization of salt, the project was expanded to include the micronutrient fortiﬁcation of wheat ﬂour. The 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) became a partner, and Rie Hiraoka assumed responsibility for 
the project. She deserves great credit for its success. The strong support and regional inﬂuence of Toregeldy 
Sharmanov, director of the Kazakhstan Academy of Nutrition in Almaty, was critically important.
The project proceeded at different paces in the various countries. Given the obstacles, it could not be 
expected to achieve its goals in all of them, even when the project was extended from 3 to 7 years, including 
a follow-on project. However, it did convince governments and industry in the target countries of the health 
importance of the project, and secured their commitment to it. It did ensure that the necessary laws and 
regulations were in place in each country, and that the producers understood the technology and standards 
for the fortiﬁcation of salt and wheat ﬂour. The number of households using iodized salt dramatically 
increased during the project, and has been maintained.
At the end of the project, it was not possible to conduct representative national surveys to determine 
changes in the iodine, iron, and folic acid status in the populations of each participating country. This 
information will eventually be obtained as part of future national nutrition surveys. Some quantitative 
data on the effectiveness of the program were obtained through “sentinel sites,” an approach adapted from 
one used for detecting the spread of infectious diseases. At the beginning of the project, a site was selected 
in each country where, for logistical reasons, early success would predict whether the program was to be 
effective nationally. A randomized population sample from each site was studied for nutritional status at the 
beginning of the project, and twice more. 
In the third round of surveys of the sentinel populations in 2007, signiﬁcant increases were observed 
in the average levels of blood hemoglobin, serum ferritin, folic acid, and urinary iodine. Corresponding 
decreases in the prevalence of anemia were found. It could be concluded that salt and wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
as a result of the project resulted in a signiﬁcant improvement in the micronutrient status of sentinel 
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households in participating countries. Some of the data and a reference to the published report of the 
sentinel studies are given in this document.
To introduce micronutrient fortiﬁcation into a country, it is essential to enlist the cooperation of both 
government and industry from the beginning, and this was done. Depending on a country’s circumstances, 
this process can be rapid or discouragingly slow. Constant technical supervision and periodic meetings of all 
national personnel and consultants involved in the program were important to the project’s success. 
Shamil Tazhibayev of the Kazakh Academy of Nutrition (KAN) was responsible for the high quality 
of the laboratory results and was outstanding in his management of the sentinel studies. Mussa Aijanov of 
KAN made an important contribution to developing the standard ﬂour fortiﬁcation formula and obtaining 
its acceptance by all the participating countries. 
Although the ADB project has ended, there is every reason to believe that progress will continue in the 
countries that participated. Certainly, all the personnel involved in this initiative at both the country and 
international levels can be proud of what was accomplished. 
Nevin S. Scrimshaw, PhD, MD, MPH 
Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
President, International Nutrition Foundation
Visiting Professor, Tufts University
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Executive Summary
Background
During the 1990s, the newly emerging countries of Central Asia, as well as neighboring Mongolia, faced 
a growing and urgent problem of disease caused by micronutrient deﬁciencies. In response, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) decided to mount a regional food fortiﬁcation initiative to reverse this spreading 
public health problem that was particularly affecting poor women and children and was costing the countries 
about 1% of their gross domestic product.
The major micronutrient deﬁciencies were iodine deﬁciency disorder and iron deﬁciency anemia (IDA). 
Iodine deﬁciency is the single most important cause of irreversible mental retardation in the world, and 
also causes cretinism-associated problems, including goiter. The prevalence of goiter ranged from 23% to 
73% in children in Central Asia at the time the initiative began—well above the 5% cutoff used to signal a 
public health problem. IDA, which impairs the cognitive development of young children, reduces the work 
productivity of manual laborers, and is a major cause of maternal mortality, is the most prevalent nutrient 
deﬁciency in the world. This deﬁciency was present in 38% of children under 5-years old and more than 
half of all pregnant women in Central Asia and Mongolia; again, well above the cutoff and indicating IDA 
was a serious public health problem. 
ADB’s involvement is rooted in its Policy for the Health Sector. The policy notes that improvements 
in health support economic growth through (i) increased worker productivity, (ii) increased returns to 
investments in education, (iii) increased returns to other factors of production, and (iv) freeing up ﬁnancial 
resources by preventing disease. Investments in health also help to reduce poverty because the poor suffer 
from worse health status and face more serious economic and ﬁnancial consequences when they become ill. 
These observations apply equally well to the speciﬁc problem of micronutrient deﬁciencies.          
However, ADB also recognizes that the solution to eliminating deﬁciencies in iodine, iron, and other 
micronutrients is not only a challenge for health policy in a narrow sense but is also a challenge for industrial 
policy. The private sector has played a major role in improving the quality of foods people regularly consume 
in industrialized countries. 
Food fortiﬁcation has helped reduce public health problems in many countries. This initiative in 
Central Asia, however, was unique in its regional approach and was the ﬁrst major initiative using public–
private partnership to address public health problems in the region. It faced several major unknown regional 
development factors:
• Would public–private partnership toward sustainable food fortiﬁcation work in countries newly 
emerging from centralized economies? 
• Could fortiﬁed staple foods be made affordable for the poor in Central Asian countries and 
Mongolia?
• Would target countries gain added value through a regional approach to food fortiﬁcation? In 
particular:
 Could regional developing-country standards in food fortiﬁcation, and the policy and 
regulatory environment to enforce them, be created, and implemented? 
 Could region-wide demand and supply for fortiﬁcation to improve health be created?
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The Regional Fortiﬁcation Initiative
ADB’s food fortiﬁcation initiative in Central Asia and Mongolia was conducted through two region-
wide projects supported by the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction. ADB approached the governments of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan1 and obtained their 
agreement to participate in the initiative, with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as the main 
partner. From the beginning of the initiative, the Kazakh Academy of Nutrition (KAN) provided technical 
guidance and took part in monitoring and evaluation.
The ﬁrst project, Improving Nutrition for Poor Mothers and Children in Asian Countries in Transition, 
aimed to improve the nutritional status and physical and mental capacity of the poor, particularly targeting 
poor women of reproductive age and children, by establishing an umbrella regional program to deliver 
micronutrient-fortiﬁed salt and wheat ﬂour. 
The second project, Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia, aimed to reinforce 
and sustain the reduction of iron deﬁciency disorder and IDA among poor women and children in Central 
Asia. 
There were ﬁve major components of the initiative: 
• Roundtable conferences and regional and national workshops. Three roundtable conferences brought 
together stakeholders from the countries and aid agencies to discuss strategies and targets, resolve major 
issues, and review progress. Eight regional workshops sought to build capacity among the project 
countries to deal with pressing issues as they arose. National workshops covered issues that needed 
agreement and coordination among the various stakeholders. 
• Fortiﬁcation of salt and ﬂour. Iodization of salt, already being done to some extent in the region, and 
fortiﬁcation of ﬂour with iron and several vitamins that were also deﬁcient in the region—which had 
not been attempted in the region and required development of a special “premix”—were the approaches 
followed. Salt producers, ﬂour millers, and bakers were assisted in upgrading processing and marketing 
technology. A 1-year supply of fortiﬁcants was also provided. 
• Capacity development. The initiative provided capacity development in appropriate areas to salt 
industry and ﬂour mill personnel, government ofﬁcers, and regulatory authorities. 
• Social marketing and mobilization. A communication strategy was developed to strengthen activities 
in policy and regulatory advocacy, provide organizational motivation and training, create new alliances, 
and provide community communication to generate demand for fortiﬁed foods.
• Monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring included project supervision, technical workshops, midterm 
review, annual auditing, and a rigorous efﬁcacy study on the impact of fortiﬁed food.
1 Azerbaijan joined after the project was approved for the other ﬁve countries, and a separate supplementary agreement was prepared.
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Achievements
By the end of the initiative in 2007, the participating countries were well on the way toward universal salt 
iodization, and at least three countries had established sustainable wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation.
Production of iodized salt through the initiative increased signiﬁcantly and even exceeded regional 
demand, and the proportion of households using quality iodized salt increased in all countries during the 
initiative, reaching 90% in Kazakhstan. By the end of the initiative, all countries had enacted legislation 
making iodization mandatory.
Initiative results indicate that almost 24 million new consumers of iodized salt were added in the 
region during the ﬁrst Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction project, and an additional 500,000 newborns 
were protected against brain damage resulting from iodine deﬁciency. The annual economic costs avoided 
by the correction of iodine deﬁciency across the region through the initiative are estimated at up to 
$300 million.
A new premix for wheat ﬂour was developed for the initiative at KAN, based on recommended dietary 
intakes, nutritional requirements and deﬁciencies in the region, and cost. Over the duration of the initiative, 
the numbers of millers fortifying their ﬂour and moves by governments toward making ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
mandatory increased.
Wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation signiﬁcantly improved the micronutrient status of children and women living 
in households where fortiﬁed ﬂour was expected to be available. Overall anemia rates dropped from 42% to 
34% in women and from 35% to 22% in children. Ferritin levels increased in both children and women, 
showing improvement in iron status, and levels of folate, one of the vitamins added to ﬂour, increased in 
both women and children. The overall level of severe folic acid deﬁciency dropped from 39% to 2% in 
children and from 13% to 2% in women.
Under the umbrella of the initiative, all the participating countries agreed on a set of fortiﬁcation 
standards and made regulations and laws accordingly. Adoption of common standards took place in the 
remarkably short time of about 2 years.
Much of the credit for the success of the initiative is because of awareness, communication, and 
marketing activities, through which the participating countries were able to obtain the support of decision 
makers and other stakeholders down to community members. Coordination of each tier of communication 
activities from policy level to that of the community was important to ensure that the right messages were 
available at the right time. In particular, motivating all the key players in fortiﬁcation was a major task and 
key factor.
Development Issues
The three development issues that ADB addressed in the initiative were all answered positively. Public–
private partnership in these mainly newly emerging market economies proved successful and vital. 
Collaboration during the initiative helped establish good working relations and strong partnership between 
the government and the salt industry and ﬂour millers in all the countries, and the salt industry and 
ﬂour millers gradually developed a sense of ownership of the fortiﬁcation program. Formation of industry 
associations and collaboration of government and nongovernment organizations in workshops, etc., further 
helped sustain the fortiﬁcation programs.
The question of affordability to the poor was initially a concern. Salt and wheat ﬂour are the most 
basic staples in the region and are very sensitive to price change. When the initiative started, the price of 
iodized salt was higher than that of noniodized salt, while the cost of ﬂour fortiﬁcation, a new concept for 
the region, was an unknown factor. However, by the time the initiative ended, the price differentials were 
insigniﬁcant. This was due in part to increasing ownership and investment by the producers due to the 
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mandatory nature of fortiﬁcation in the region. Also, growing demand allowed for economies of scale in 
production.
Finally, the regional approach was vindicated, despite the competitiveness of the Central Asian 
countries and their many pressing development problems and priorities. The regional approach enabled 
establishment of common standards for fortiﬁed salt and ﬂour, achieved economies of scale, took advantage 
of cross-learning, and enriched interregional cooperation. ADB support on a country-by-country basis 
would not have had these advantages and would have been unable to address regional issues, such as trade 
and its regulation.
Lessons
A great many lessons that will prove useful for future work in this ﬁeld were learned. The following are some 
major ones:
• Mandatory fortiﬁcation legislation is a prerequisite for ensuring universal access to fortiﬁed foods.
• Political support at the highest level is needed to ensure sustainability of food fortiﬁcation programs.
• Public–private partnership was essential in sustaining the momentum of the initiative.
• Quality control in most of the countries was difﬁcult and needs further strengthening at both industrial 
and retail levels.
• Incentives for food producers were essential during program development to prevent their discouragement 
because of initial losses during fortiﬁcation start-up. Cost sharing by industry, however, was an important 
ﬁrst step toward sustainability. Donor dependency appeared to be one of the reasons that universal salt 
iodization had not happened previously.
• Financial capacity of food producers is a key to sustainable food fortiﬁcation. For small producers, 
innovative ways to ensure reliable and reasonably priced fortiﬁcant supplies are necessary.
• A strong initial information base is necessary on, for example, prevalence of deﬁciencies and the 
production and ﬁnancial capacity of salt and ﬂour producers; if absent, it should be an early priority of 
fortiﬁcation programs.
• A need for awareness building on the advantages of fortiﬁed food and its limited availability at local 
markets was evident in order to increase demand from producers and consumers. Intense awareness 
campaigns were needed and innovative ways to improve demand are still required.
• Limited information hampered the initiative from the outset. The initiative ﬁlled critical information 
gaps in food fortiﬁcation knowledge in the participating countries that will be vital for future fortiﬁcation 
activities in the region. Still, any new attempt to fortify food should be preceded by situation analysis of 
the particular food industry in addition to studying the feasibility of fortiﬁcation itself.
• Technology transfer accelerated establishment of food fortiﬁcation better than using foreign capacity. 
Domestic capacity development helped the countries to carry out food fortiﬁcation without external 
help.
• Risks of external shocks need to be taken into account. For example, wheat ﬂour production, availability, 
and price vary depending on weather. This had a serious impact on ﬂour fortiﬁcation during the 
initiative. Political stability is another major factor in program sustainability.
Executive Summary xvii
Conclusions
In view of the successes of the initiative, the validation of ADB’s regional approach to fortiﬁcation, and in 
light of the lessons from the initiative, ADB should continue in its role of catalyst in nutrition development 
efforts in the region, particularly in advocating and promoting fortiﬁcation of foods that can improve the 
micronutrient status of the poor. 
Inclusive growth and regional integration are two of the three strategic agendas of ADB’s long-term 
strategic framework for 2008–2020, Strategy 2020,2 which emphasizes the private sector as a driving force 
for inclusive growth. Through public–private partnership, ADB should reinvigorate its efforts to promote 
food fortiﬁcation so as to deliver much-needed micronutrients to populations in need. 
2 ADB. 2008. Strategy 2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008–2020. Manila.
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1. Background
Central Asia’s Micronutrient  
Deﬁciencies
In 2001, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
produced a television documentary about the 
rising incidence of cretinism, mental retardation, 
and associated problems, such as goiter, in children 
in Central Asia. From Azerbaijan in the west to 
Mongolia in the east, across Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 
the story was the same.
These conditions, caused by iodine deﬁciency, 
could be traced to the breakdown of health programs 
in the former Soviet republics toward the end of the 
Soviet Union. Initially, the republics were served 
from a few centralized agencies around the former 
Soviet Union, depending on need. Iodine was a 
well-known need, and iodized salt was distributed 
regularly from Ukraine, reaching most of the 
populations in iodine-deﬁcient areas. By the time 
the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, however, 
the iodine program had virtually disintegrated. 
Mongolia took action in the mid-1990s to fortify 
salt, but by the end of the decade, less than half the 
population was using iodized salt.
The countries in and around Central Asia lie 
in areas with low soil iodine, leaving ﬁsh as the 
main source of natural iodine. On the western side 
of the region, Caspian Sea ﬁsh have high iodine 
content, but elsewhere the harvest is freshwater ﬁsh, 
which have low iodine content. Regardless, most 
of the region’s ﬁsheries declined in the decade after 
independence—by up to 90% in most countries.
The countries’ economies also were stretched 
as they grappled with the overnight demise of the 
Soviet centrally planned economy. The 1990s saw a 
great increase in poverty in Central Asia, from which 
individual countries are still recovering as they come 
to grips, at different speeds, with a market economy. 
After food subsidies were withdrawn, many residents 
could not afford adequate nutrition in the decade 
after independence. 
Therein lies the core problem: While foods 
may appear to be adequately nutritious, providing 
sufﬁcient carbohydrates, fats, and protein, they may 
lack iodine. Iodine content depends more on the 
soil level of iodine than on other factors, so what 
may be an iodine-sufﬁcient diet in one place may be 
insufﬁcient elsewhere. The consumer has no way of 
knowing, in the absence of health or food surveys, 
that a creeping public health problem is unfolding; 
hence, the problem is called “hidden hunger.”
Goiter is the physical trait commonly used 
for identifying iodine deﬁciency disorders (IDD). 
Table 1.1: Prevalence of Goiter among Children in Central Asia and Mongolia
Item Azerbaijana Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz  
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Total goiter  
prevalence (%)
(survey period)
11.1 
(1996)
36.7
(2000–2001)
49.1
(1994)
23.0
(2001)
68.7
(1999)
73.0
(1998)
a Azerbaijan’s data are on prevalence in adults.
Source: B. de Benoist, et al., eds. 2004. Iodine Status Worldwide. WHO Global Database on Iodine Deﬁciency. Geneva: WHO.
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At the end of the 1990s, goiter prevalence among 
school-aged children ranged from 23% to 73% in 
Central Asia—well above the 5% cutoff used to 
signal a public health problem (Table 1.1).1 
Hidden hunger is not conﬁned to iodine deﬁciency. 
Iron deﬁciency anemia (IDA) affects more people in 
the world than any other condition.2 IDA impairs the 
cognitive development of young children, reduces the 
work productivity of manual laborers, and is a major 
cause of maternal mortality. The delay in cognitive 
development is often irreversible. It is prevalent in 
wheat-eating populations, such as those in Central 
Asia and Mongolia, because essential micronutrients 
are lost during wheat milling. This deﬁciency was 
present in 38% of children under 5 years old and more 
than half of all pregnant women in Central Asia and 
Mongolia—again, well above the 5% cutoff used to 
signal a public health problem (Table 1.2).3 
The developmental importance of folic acid 
deﬁciency,4 which results in a severe birth defect 
involving the brain or spinal chord (spina biﬁda), 
and zinc deﬁciency,5 which causes suboptimal body 
functioning, has recently also been recognized.
Micronutrient malnutrition is more than 
a health problem. Estimates from a number of 
countries suggest that micronutrient malnutrition 
has cost the national economies in Central Asia 
about 1% of their gross domestic product.6 The 
public investment required to eliminate the 
deﬁciency is low compared to the savings in health 
care and education costs, improved work ability and 
productivity, increased economic growth, and local 
and national development.
Indeed, some countries were giving priority to 
reducing IDD; yet, despite assistance from the World 
Health Organization (WHO), United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and some bilateral 
donors, not much more than 20% of households 
in Central Asia were using iodized salt by the end of 
the 20th century. 
Public health programs can provide supplements 
to certain groups for a short time, but they are 
Table 1.2: Anemia Prevalence in Central Asia and Mongolia (%)
Country
Preschool Children 
(<5 years old) Pregnant Women
Nonpregnant Women of 
Reproductive Age 
Azerbaijan 32 38 40
Kazakhstan 36 26 36
Kyrgyz Republic 50 34 38
Mongolia 21 37 14
Tajikistan 38 45 41
Turkmenistan 33 30 48
Uzbekistan 38 54 65
Note: WHO category of public health signiﬁcance for anemia prevalence: mild 5.0%–19.9%; moderate 20.0%–39.9%; severe 40.0%.
Source: B. de Benoist, et al., eds. 2008. Worldwide Prevalence of Anaemia 1993–2005. WHO Global Database on Anaemia. Geneva: WHO.
1 B. de Benoist, et al., eds. 2004. Iodine Status Worldwide. WHO Global Database on Iodine Deﬁciency. Geneva: World Health 
Organization (WHO).
2 WHO. 2009. Micronutrient Deﬁciencies. www.who.int/nutrition/topics/ida/en/index.html
3 B. de Benoist, et al. 2008. Worldwide Prevalence of Anaemia 1993–2005. WHO Global Database on Anaemia. Geneva: WHO.
4 There is now general agreement that women need 400 micrograms of folic acid per day, an amount that cannot be provided by normal 
diets, which indicates the need for fortiﬁcation or supplementation. N. Wald, et al. 2001. Quantifying the Effect of Folic Acid. Lancet. 
358 (9298). p. 2,069.
5 Zinc is required for normal growth and health; deﬁciencies affect about one-third of the world’s population. WHO. 2002. World Health 
Report 2002. Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life. Geneva.
6 ADB. 2005. Special Evaluation Study of Selected ADB Interventions on Nutrition and Food Fortiﬁcation. Manila.
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neither comprehensive nor sustainable. The most 
cost-effective solution lies in promoting iodized salt 
and iron-fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour (two major staples in 
the region) to combat IDD and IDA.7 
Cost-effective technologies can increase access 
to iodized salt and iron-fortiﬁed wheat by the poor. 
Fortifying salt with potassium iodate costs an extra 
$0.05 per person per year, and fortifying wheat ﬂour 
with iron costs an extra $0.09 per person per year.8 
Fortifying both salt and ﬂour reduces maternal 
mortality and enhances cognitive development in 
young children. Also, mass fortiﬁcation of food 
staples does not require people to change their eating 
habits. Resistance to changing eating habits has 
proven to be a major obstacle in supplementation 
programs and diet changes. 
Until 2001, no large-scale fortiﬁcation efforts 
were made to address IDA in the region. In 1997, 
UNICEF began an anemia prevention and control 
program in the Central Asian countries, using 
supplements of iron tablets, or iron tablets and 
folate tablets, and education on the health issues. 
This program continues, but education alone has 
limited effect, while distributing free supplements 
requires continuous funding by donor agencies or 
the government. UNICEF also started two country 
projects in Central Asia involving fortifying ﬂour 
with iron. One of these projects, in Turkmenistan, 
began in 2000 and continues to the present.
The Central Asian countries born from the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 suffered 
pressing micronutrient problems for a decade, 
with each country making attempts to address the 
problems internally (Appendix 1). What brought 
the issues to international attention in 2001?
The occasion was a high-level forum in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, where a landmark agreement was forged 
by the Central Asian countries and Mongolia. This 
Almaty Declaration (Appendix 2) committed them 
to mitigating micronutrient malnutrition—their 
hidden hunger—with support from the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction (JFPR). The countries agreed on 
a set of food fortiﬁcation principles, strategies, and 
actions involving cooperation and harmonization 
in food standards and trade regulations across the 
region.
Yet, they still had far to go on the road to 
economic health. Many visible problems had to be 
overcome, while hidden hunger remained invisible 
to both policy makers and the public. The private 
sector was not being encouraged to fortify food 
products.
Additionally, the countries were only a decade 
old and inexperienced in working with  the private 
sector. Several attempts by donors to promote 
regional economic cooperation on water resources 
and other issues had failed, and the countries had little 
experience of dealing with multilateral institutions, 
such as ADB. So, it was a serious question if  such a 
region-wide program would work.
ADB’s Involvement with  
Food Fortiﬁcation
ADB Policy 
Nutrition is a priority in many projects and programs 
supported or initiated by ADB. ADB has shown 
clear and strong support for nutrition interventions, 
such as nutrition education, curbing micronutrient 
deﬁciencies, basic nutrition for women, food 
fortiﬁcation, and early childhood development. 
Such support for nutrition is either integrated into, 
or complementary to, support for other areas, such 
as livelihood and water resources, health (especially 
public health programs such as maternal and child 
health), education, and gender-related areas. 
ADB’s involvement is rooted in its Policy for 
the Health Sector.9 The policy notes that health 
improvements support economic growth through 
(i) increased worker productivity; (ii) increased 
returns on investments in education; (iii) increased 
returns on other factors of production; and 
(iv) preventing disease, which frees up ﬁnancial 
resources. Investments in health also help reduce 
7 Despite their limitations, both dietary diversiﬁcation through a broad-based food policy and supplementation for high-risk groups 
remain options in an integrated strategy for eliminating micronutrient malnutrition.
8 Although a bit more expensive, an iron-based ﬂour premix with minerals is highly cost-effective in reducing nutritional deﬁciencies and 
improving public heath and the educability of children.
9 ADB. 1999. Policy for the Health Sector. Manila.
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poverty, because the poor suffer from worse health in 
general and face more serious ﬁnancial consequences 
when they become ill. So, investments in health 
contribute to human development and population 
planning. These general observations apply equally to 
the speciﬁc problem of micronutrient deﬁciencies.
However, ADB also recognizes that the solution 
to eliminating deﬁciencies in iodine, iron, and other 
micronutrients is not only a challenge for health 
policy in a narrow sense, but is also for industrial 
policy. The private sector has played a major role 
in improving the quality of foods people regularly 
consume in industrialized countries. 
As a regional ﬁnancial institution, ADB sees 
fortiﬁcation as an area where the private food 
producers, governments, and consumers can 
collaborate, and is a good example of how human 
and economic development can mutually reinforce. 
Manila Forum 2000—a Turning Point
Recognizing that deﬁciencies in certain vitamins 
and minerals constitute a serious health problem 
throughout Asia and the Paciﬁc, ADB combined 
resources with the Micronutrient Initiative and the 
International Life Sciences Institute to conduct the 
Manila Forum 2000: Strategies to Fortify Essential 
Foods in Asia and the Paciﬁc, a 4-day meeting 
on using food fortiﬁcation to address nutrient 
deﬁciencies. The February 2000 conference, attended 
by delegations from eight developing countries in 
Asia and the Paciﬁc, including the Kyrgyz Republic, 
produced a consensus statement that included: 
“All salt intended for human consumption should 
be iodized” and “ﬂour fortiﬁcation with essential 
vitamins and minerals should be an integral part of 
all strategies to control and prevent micronutrient 
deﬁciencies.” The meeting also advocated that 
“centers of excellence” be established around the 
world to help support food fortiﬁcation.10
As a result of the Manila Forum 2000, ADB 
and partners mounted a regional initiative to 
fortify essential foods for the poor. In the Central 
Asian countries and Mongolia, hidden hunger was 
gradually depriving the citizens, especially mothers 
and young children, of nutrition adequate for proper 
physical and mental development. 
Development Questions
Food fortiﬁcation has helped reduce public health 
problems in many countries. This initiative in 
Central Asia, however, was unique in its regional 
approach and was the ﬁrst major initiative using 
public–private partnership to address public health 
problems in the region. It faced several major 
unknown regional development factors:
• Would public–private partnership toward 
sustainable food fortiﬁcation work in countries 
newly emerging from centralized economies? 
• Could fortiﬁed staple foods be made affordable 
for the poor in Central Asian countries and 
Mongolia?
• Would target countries gain added value through 
a regional approach to food fortiﬁcation? In 
particular:
 Could regional developing-country 
standards in food fortiﬁcation, 
and the policy and regulatory 
environment to enforce them, be 
created and implemented? 
 Could region-wide demand and 
supply for fortiﬁcation to improve 
health be created?
10 ADB. 2000. Manila Forum 2000: Strategies to Fortify Essential Foods in Asia and the Paciﬁc. Manila; Washington, DC: International Life 
Sciences Institute; Ottawa: Micronutrient Initiative.
2. The Regional Fortiﬁcation Initiative
Because of Central Asia’s regional unknowns, 
ADB and client countries could not immediately 
proceed to develop a normal loan project. In this 
case, the JFPR had just been set up under ADB’s 
administration to ﬁnance pilot projects for poverty 
reduction. ADB seized the opportunity and 
convinced the Government of Japan to ﬁnance a 
food fortiﬁcation pilot in the region.
ADB’s food fortiﬁcation initiative in Central 
Asia and Mongolia was conducted through two 
region-wide projects supported by the JFPR. 
ADB approached the governments of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan11 and obtained their 
agreement to participate in the initiative (see map 
on page xviii). UNICEF  and the Kazakh Academy 
of Nutrition (KAN) were the main partners. From 
the beginning, KAN provided technical guidance 
and took part in monitoring and evaluation.
The ﬁrst project—Improving Nutrition for 
Poor Mothers and Children in Asian Countries 
in Transition (hereafter called the ﬁrst JFPR 
project)12—began in 2001 and ran for 3.5 years. 
The project aimed to improve the nutrition status 
and physical and mental capacity of the poor, 
particularly targeting poor women of reproductive 
age and children, by establishing an umbrella 
regional program to deliver micronutrient-fortiﬁed 
salt and wheat ﬂour. 
The second project—Sustainable Food 
Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia (the 
second JFPR project)13—began in early 2005 and 
ended in 2007. It aimed to reinforce and sustain the 
reduction of IDD and IDA among poor women 
and children in Central Asia. 
The ﬁrst project received $6.8 million, and 
the second received $2.0 million, from the JFPR 
administered by ADB. By the time of the second 
project, private food producers had become major 
investors in food fortiﬁcation.
Objectives and Strategies
The main objective of the ﬁrst JFPR project was to 
expand salt iodization in the region, which had been 
initiated in Central Asia by UNICEF and other 
groups but had reached only part of the populations. 
Flour fortiﬁcation was included mainly to address 
the widespread problem of IDA. This project 
provided technology and equipment for fortiﬁcation 
according to best international practices. It sought 
to reach a signiﬁcant proportion of the populations; 
enable a consensus among the countries on regional 
standards for food fortiﬁcation, marketing, and 
trade; strengthen the food sector’s regulatory 
capability; and increase consumer demand through 
nongovernment organization (NGO) partnerships.
11 Azerbaijan joined after the project was approved for the other ﬁve countries, and a separate supplementary agreement was prepared.
12 ADB. 2001. Grant Assistance to Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for Improving Nutrition for Poor 
Mothers and Children in Asian Countries in Transition. Manila. Azerbaijan was added using a supplementary grant in 2001 after the 
grant was approved.
13 ADB. 2004. Grant Assistance to Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation. 
Manila. Azerbaijan was not covered by this project.
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The objectives of the second JFPR project 
were to sustain household consumption of iodized 
salt achieved under the ﬁrst project, and to expand 
ﬂour fortiﬁcation and make it sustainable. The 
second project also paid parallel attention to supply 
(production and distribution), demand (public 
awareness and demand creation), and regulation 
(quality control, implementation of regulations and 
legislation, and trade facilitation) but did not ﬁnance 
any fortiﬁcant or equipment for food producers. 
Scope of the Initiative
The projects comprised ﬁve major components. 
1.  Roundtable Conferences and Regional 
and National Workshops 
Three roundtable conferences were held in Almaty 
and became known as the Almaty Forums. Their 
intent was to bring together stakeholders from the 
Central Asian countries and development agencies 
to discuss strategies and targets, resolve major 
issues, and review progress. Participants included 
representatives from the participating countries’ 
public health services, the private sector (federations 
of ﬂour millers and salt producers), NGOs that 
focus on women and children, external assistance 
agencies, and senior central and local government 
ofﬁcials. As the initiative progressed and the region 
became recognized as a business opportunity, 
international suppliers of equipment and fortiﬁcants 
began participating as observers. 
Regional workshops sought to build capacity, 
such as communications, regulations and standards, 
production technologies, and monitoring and 
evaluation, among the project countries to deal with 
urgent issues. Regional workshops were also used 
by private food producers to build networks with 
international suppliers. Similarly, national workshops 
were held to cultivate awareness, capacity, and social 
mobilization. (The workshop topics, locations, and 
dates are given in Appendix 3.)
2. Fortiﬁcation of Salt and Flour
Iodization of salt, a universally used commodity, was 
already established worldwide as the preferred way 
to improve iodine levels in human populations. The 
ﬁrst JFPR project endorsed this approach, using 
universal salt iodization (USI) standards.
For ﬂour fortiﬁcation, the picture was less clear. 
There had been no previous attempt on a large scale 
to introduce iron into wheat ﬂour in the region,14 
and there were other prominent deﬁciencies in 
the populations that could be reversed through 
fortiﬁcation of ﬂour with other micronutrients, 
particularly folic acid (effective in reducing neural 
tube birth defects) and zinc (required in adequate 
amounts for normal pregnancy and healthy 
growth of children). Fortiﬁcation also provided 
the opportunity to introduce essential B-complex 
vitamins. 
The participating governments worked with 
selected salt producers, ﬂour millers, and bakers 
to upgrade and retool processing technology for 
micronutrient-enriched salt and wheat ﬂour. The 
initiative provided a 1-year supply of fortiﬁcants—
potassium iodate for salt and iron-based premix for 
ﬂour—and subsidized two-thirds of the fortiﬁcant 
costs. It also advised on the most appropriate ways of 
iodizing salt, and provided some essential laboratory 
equipment and diagnostic reagents.
Through the initiative, participants made 
bulk purchases of equipment and fortiﬁcants, thus 
achieving both economy of scale and standardization 
of inputs (Table 2.1). However, the different salt 
supply situation among the countries required 
different approaches in order to increase the number 
of people in each country who regularly consumed 
iodized salt. In some cases, the availability of imported 
or freely available noniodized salt complicated the 
approach.
14 Two previous ﬂour fortiﬁcation projects in Central Asia—one in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1995 and one in Turkmenistan in 2000, both 
initiated by UNICEF—involved fortifying ﬂour with iron from ferrous sulfate. The Kyrgyz Republic project ran into trouble when 
some of the fortiﬁed ﬂour turned rancid and changed color. Turkmenistan continues to fortify ﬂour. 
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The ﬂour fortiﬁcation initiative focused ﬁrst on 
the larger ﬂour mills, with the aim of covering one-
third of each country’s ﬂour consumption.15 As with 
salt, imports of nonfortiﬁed ﬂour complicated the 
work.
3. Capacity Development
The initiative helped salt industries and ﬂour 
mills procure fortiﬁcants, equipment, and other 
essential items for food fortiﬁcation, along with 
assuring the quality of fortiﬁed food. It helped 
governments develop and strengthen fortiﬁcation 
policy and implement food fortiﬁcation legislation 
and regulations; improve the quality assurance and 
control (QAC) systems of both governments and 
food producers, including border control of trade in 
salt; and develop regulatory frameworks, standards, 
and agreements to facilitate trade of fortiﬁed food 
in the region. It also helped regulatory authorities 
develop food-testing instruments and surveys for 
monitoring the enriched food program for mothers 
and children.
The regional workshops helped fortiﬁcation 
stakeholders develop capacity in areas of concern 
across the participating countries. All countries sent 
qualiﬁed delegations to the workshops, which were 
based on the latest food science and technology 
and assisted by qualiﬁed international consultants. 
The country delegations were headed by senior 
government ofﬁcials and included representatives 
from the private sector and civil society.
KAN and UNICEF sent delegations to all 
roundtable meetings and regional workshops. As 
the project progressed and received international 
attention, the Global Alliance for Improving 
Nutrition (GAIN), the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), and interested suppliers also 
participated at their own cost. Private food producers 
started ﬁnancing their own participation at regional 
workshops in the second half of the initiative. 
15 The original resolution was to fortify ﬂour to the maximum extent possible in the region. An early objective was to enable a sufﬁcient 
number of mills in each country to fortify ﬂour so that one-third of wheat ﬂour consumed in the country would be fortiﬁed. This was 
later reﬁned to fortifying the premium and ﬁrst-grade ﬂour, because other types of ﬂour were not intended to be fortiﬁed. The “one-
third” objective was an arbitrary ﬁgure used to establish the number of mills to set up for fortifying ﬂour and the quantities of premix 
to order, and to qualify the project’s degree of success. That objective proved to be an overly ambitious goal that was unrealistic for some 
of the participating countries. 
Table 2.1: Physical Inputs for Salt Iodization in the First Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Project,  
by Country
Country
Number of 
Beneﬁciary 
Industries
Project Support
Potassium 
Iodate 
(tons)
Iodization 
Equipment
Packaging 
Equipment 
and Supplies
Packaging 
Supplies
Total  
Costs*  
($)
Azerbaijan 3 0.30 1 3 Salt bags 61,410
Kazakhstan 2 3.25 1 1 Salt bags 76,410
Kyrgyz Republic 7 1.00 3 2 Salt bags and 
ﬁlm rolls
75,406
Mongolia 22 0.20 … 4 Salt bags 61,306
Tajikistan 3 1.15 2 2 Salt bags 90,116
Uzbekistan 13 3.90 12 5 Salt bags and 
ﬁlm rolls
268,651
Total 50 9.80 19 17  633,299
* Including installation costs.
Source: ADB. 2008  Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s 
report. Manila.
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4. Social Marketing and Mobilization
The public, especially the target groups of poor 
women and children, had to be informed about 
fortiﬁed food in a structured way that would lead 
them to select the foods as they came available. 
The initiative needed to promote public awareness 
and acceptance of micronutrient-enriched salt and 
wheat ﬂour, and to support innovative activities in 
communities that would increase the poor’s access 
to these foods.
The ﬁrst JFPR project developed a 
communication strategy to strengthen activities 
in policy and regulatory advocacy, provide 
organizational motivation and training, create new 
alliances, and provide community communication 
to generate demand for fortiﬁed foods. Government 
ofﬁcials and prominent people appeared on 
television advocating fortiﬁed foods. Parliaments 
conducted hearings. The initiative supported 
production of audiovisual materials, pamphlets, 
posters, and publications in newspapers; workshops; 
and training. It engaged NGOs to conduct social 
mobilization activities. KAN screened materials 
before release to ensure that the same message was 
communicated in each country. 
5. Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring the initiative’s progress included project 
supervision, technical workshops, midterm review, 
annual auditing, and quarterly or annual review of 
interim indicators including production of fortiﬁed 
salt and wheat ﬂour and their quality; also, a sentinel 
study on the efﬁcacy of fortiﬁed food and economic 
analysis of food fortiﬁcation to reduce IDD and 
IDA were also undertaken.
A monitoring and evaluation framework that 
included several performance indicators was agreed 
upon at one of the regional workshops among 
country project ofﬁces (CPOs) (Appendix 4). 
The main objective of the sentinel study was to 
evaluate the effect of food fortiﬁcation on people’s 
micronutrient status. The study periodically 
examined micronutrient status and consumption of 
fortiﬁed foods among the same sample households—
40 households and 120 individuals (80 children 
2–15 years of age and 40 women 15–49 years of 
age) in each country.
The ﬁrst survey, from December 2002 to April 
2003, established a baseline. A second survey followed 
in May–August 2004, and a third in the latter half 
of 2007. Each survey interviewed participants, took 
blood and urine samples, and tested the salt and 
ﬂour that participants used. UNICEF shared the 
cost of the ﬁrst and second surveys.
The initiative and UNICEF jointly ﬁnanced the 
ﬁrst-ever nutrition survey in Tajikistan in 2003.16
Alliance Building
Before the initiative began, ADB reached an 
understanding with the ﬁnance ministries in the 
six participating countries that the projects would 
require some governance reforms. Notes of discussion 
detailing the responsibilities of ADB, government, 
private sector, and donor partners were approved by 
all governments, who promised to apply ﬁscal and 
trade reforms for the duration of the project—and 
possibly beyond if the reforms worked well. At the 
ﬁrst Almaty Forum, the notes of discussion were 
converted to country investment plans to reduce 
micronutrient deﬁciencies. These discussions deﬁned 
the roles for the different stakeholders, as follows:
• The central governments of the project 
countries would establish legal and regulatory 
frameworks for producing safe fortiﬁed foods, 
provide incentives in the form of tax and tariff 
exemption for equipment and fortiﬁcants, and 
reduce value-added tax for fortiﬁed foods. 
• Private food producers (except ﬂour mills in 
Uzbekistan, which were partly owned by the 
government) would produce iodized salt and 
fortiﬁed ﬂour. 
• The public health services in each country 
would undertake surveillance and monitoring. 
• NGOs in partnership with the governments 
would carry out social marketing campaigns to 
stimulate demand.
16 Ministry of Health of the Republic of Tajikistan, UNICEF, ADB, and WHO. 2004. Nutrition Status of Mothers and Children in 
Tajikistan. Dushanbe.
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The initiative invested time and energy in 
building alliances among the governments, private 
food producers, and civil society. Each country 
established a steering committee comprising 
representatives of the public and private sectors, and 
civil society. The steering committees later became 
national food fortiﬁcation alliances. Similarly, the 
initiative worked to build the capacity of associations 
of food producers and helped the associations 
network with those in other countries.
Implementation Arrangements
ADB coordinated the projects. The Regional 
Coordination and Administration Ofﬁce was set up 
in Almaty to coordinate activities for all participants 
and be responsible for procuring equipment and 
fortiﬁcants. Each participating country had a CPO 
and a steering committee for project oversight, 
comprising representatives from the ﬁnance, 
planning and investment, and health ministries; the 
private food industry; and the NGO community. 
For the ﬁrst project, each country selected 
special-focus oblasts (provinces) or raions (districts) 
for intensive project coverage. These were usually 
among the poorest areas of the countries. Although 
some activities (such as community mobilization) 
concentrated in these pilot areas, substantial parts of 
project activities covered the nation. Food producers 
were not necessarily selected from the pilot areas. 
But by the second project, all activities covered the 
entire countries.
The ministries of health of the participating 
countries were the executing agencies of the national 
projects through the CPOs. The CPOs were headed 
by the country project coordinators, who were 
health specialists supported by ﬁnancial analysts. 
The coordinators worked closely with different 
government ministries and agencies, the private 
sector food industries, and NGOs.
Each country developed a country investment 
plan that was agreed upon between each government 
and ADB. The CPOs submitted ﬁnancial, progress, 
and project completion reports to the Regional 
Coordination and Administration Ofﬁce, which 
monitored ﬁnancial disbursement and project 
activities and prepared consolidated project reports 
and consolidated ﬁnancial statements.
Achievements of the Initiative
Despite the unknown factors faced at its beginning, 
the initiative succeeded on various fronts: 
• The number of households which regulary use 
iodized salt dramatically increased.
• Two countries (Kazakhstan and Mongolia) 
demonstrated sustainable-quality production 
of fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour, although the initiative’s 
objective to fortify one-third of wheat ﬂour 
consumed in the participating countries proved 
difﬁcult, particularly for countries with high 
ﬂour imports and little wheat production. 
• All participating countries moved towards USI 
and enacted USI laws.
• All participating countries adopted common 
standards for iodization and ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
within 2 years,
• Iodized salt and fortiﬁed ﬂour were affordable. 
Fortiﬁcation
Iodized Salt Production
At the beginning of the initiative, each country 
introduced amendments of the iodized salt production 
standard, speciﬁcally on iodization level (30–40 parts 
per million [ppm] in all countries) and the substitution 
of potassium iodate for potassium iodide.
Through the initiative, production of iodized 
salt increased signiﬁcantly and even exceeded 
regional demand (Figure 2.2), and subsequently 
the number of households consuming iodized salt 
dramatically increased (Figure 2.3). 
While only about 25% of households of the 
participating countries were using iodized salt at the 
beginning of the initiative, by the end of the ﬁrst 
project about 66% of the households were using 
iodized salt, and the rate was maintained through 
the second project. The multiple indicator cluster 
surveys (MICSs) have conﬁrmed the outstanding 
progress made in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
and Mongolia, and the signiﬁcant progress made in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Figure 2.3). 
The extent of fortiﬁed salt distribution and 
consumption differed among the participating 
countries. 
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In Kazakhstan, salt production was concentrated 
in a few large private companies. Two of them were 
initially involved and a third, new, company later 
joined. One was given technical assistance under 
the initiative, which contributed to the quality of 
its production. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the number of 
medium-sized, sustainable salt companies increased 
Figure 2.2: Annual Iodized Salt Production as Percentage of Annual 
Salt Consumption in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia Implementation 
Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country project reports.
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of Households Using Iodized Salt in Central Asia 
and Mongolia in 1995–2006 Compared to World Averages
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia 
Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country 
project reports, and UNICEF State of the World’s Children reports, 2001–2008.
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to 12, which ensured the production of 80%–90% 
of national demand. The remainder was imported 
from other Central Asian countries. 
Mongolia established a reasonable balance 
between supplying quality iodized salt imported 
from the People’s Republic of China to central areas, 
and domestically produced iodized salt to remote 
provinces. The initiative supported the construction 
of two salt factories at salt deposit sites in remote 
provinces, which helped improve the quality of the 
salt produced.  
In Tajikistan, one company produced almost 
enough iodized salt to meet national demand. 
However, illegal noniodized salt still dominated 
local retail markets.17 
Uzbekistan promoted establishment of a few 
modern salt companies and improved the quality of 
the iodized salt produced by existing salt factories. 
By 2007, there were 60 salt producers, of which the 
13 participating salt producers provided two-thirds 
of national production.
Most participating countries have developed 
a national database covering their iodized salt 
programs. All conduct regular surveys to assess 
iodized salt coverage with assistance from UNICEF, 
the CDC, and other international agencies. ADB 
ﬁnanced the Community-Based Early Childhood 
Development Project in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
which annually monitored household use of iodized 
salt in remote districts. Results of salt testing for 
iodine are often collected as one of the indicators in 
broader-based health and nutrition surveys, such as 
demographic and health surveys and MICSs.
Fortiﬁed Flour Production
Unlike salt iodization, for which potassium iodate 
is the standard fortiﬁcant, for ﬂour fortiﬁcation a 
premix had to be developed prior to production. 
The following considerations helped determine 
what levels and sources of micronutrients to add.
• Impact: Amounts and sources added must 
be capable of producing a signiﬁcant positive 
impact.
• Safety: Amounts and sources added should not 
cause potential harm.
• Sensory: There should be no adverse effect 
on the color, shelf life, baking properties, or 
consumer acceptance.
• Cost: Costs to the producer or consumer should 
be reasonable and acceptable.
KAN developed a new premix for wheat ﬂour, 
based on recommended dietary intakes, nutritional 
requirements and deﬁciencies in the region, and 
cost. The premix contained electrolytic iron, zinc, 
folic acid (vitamin B
9
), and three other B vitamins: 
thiamin (vitamin B
1
), riboﬂavin (vitamin B
2
), and 
niacin (vitamin B
3
). All the participating countries 
adopted this ﬂour premix, called KAP Komplex 1.18 
The amount of each micronutrient to add was 
calculated to be the amount sufﬁcient to make up 
for the shortfall between the estimated normal intake 
of these six micronutrients within the region and 
their recommended dietary intakes, for an average 
ﬂour consumption of 260 grams per person per day. 
Minimum standards were developed for use of the ﬂour 
premix, as shown in Table 2.2. These standards were 
used in regulations in all the participating countries.
To achieve the maximum impact in the shortest 
time, the initiative began fortiﬁcation at mills with 
production of more than 200 tons per day. When 
the ﬁrst project was designed, there was almost no 
data on ﬂour mills in the region. Once fortiﬁcation 
started, however, project teams in countries, regions, 
and ADB realized that large-mill production was not 
necessarily the best option. In the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan, only medium-sized mills were 
functional. By the end of the ﬁrst project, medium-
sized mills in the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and 
Tajikistan were brought into the project. 
17 While some of the salt produced in Tajikistan was exported to neighboring countries, this still could not fully explain the gap between 
the amount of iodized salt produced and the amount apparently consumed in the country.
18 Vitamin A was not included because of its impact on cost and the belief that other foods, such as vegetable oil and margarine, were more 
appropriate and cost-effective carriers for this vitamin. Vitamins B12 and B6 were not considered at the time because not as much was 
known about them in regard to ﬂour fortiﬁcation as is known now. Had the fortiﬁcation been devised today, vitamin B12 may have 
been included.
12 Satisfying Hidden Hunger: Addressing Micronutrient Deficiencies in Central Asia
Table 2.2: Ingredients of KAP Komplex 1 
(ppm)
Micronutrient Addeda Natural Total Standard
Thiamin  
(vitamin B1)
2.0 2.0 4.0 3.3
Riboﬂavin  
(vitamin B2)
3.0 0.4 3.4 2.8
Niacin 
(vitamin B3)
10.0 12.0 22.0 18.0
Folic acid  
(vitamin B9)
1.5 0.2 1.7 1.5
Iron (electrolytic) 50.0 14.0 64.0 55.0
Zinc 22.0 7.0 29.0 25.0
ppm = parts per million.
a By KAP Komplex 1 premix added at 150 grams per ton.
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Wheat Flour Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. Experiences of 
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. Manila.
Figure 2.4: Annual Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour Production as Percentage 
of Annual Wheat Flour Consumption in Central Asia  and Mongolia, 
2003–2007
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia. 
Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s Report. Manila. Data source: country 
project reports.
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Fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour production reached the 
targeted amount only in Mongolia, although it 
increased in Kazakhstan and continued in the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan (Figure 2.4). Uzbekistan, 
which received the support of the Global Alliance 
for Improving Nutrition for ﬂour fortiﬁcation, did 
not receive the second JFPR project’s support for 
ﬂour fortiﬁcation, and, hence, is not included in 
Figure 2.4. However, Uzbekistan’s national wheat 
ﬂour fortiﬁcation program increased the number of 
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participating mills and used the standard procedures 
in wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation, premix formulation, and 
quality assurance and control (QAC) as developed 
under the initiative.
Although the projects did not achieve their own 
targets, compared with other areas the participating 
countries have made remarkable progress. When the 
initiative began, some Eastern European countries 
were showing an interest in ﬂour fortiﬁcation but 
had been unable to get anything started, largely 
due to a lack of external support. Brazil had been 
working on a program and began fortifying ﬂour 
in a few mills in 2004, but not to the extent 
accomplished in Central Asia. Argentina had 
adopted ﬂour fortiﬁcation standards but had no 
mills fortifying ﬂour. Morocco had not yet started 
fortifying ﬂour, and Egypt had been arguing about 
fortiﬁcation for 20 years.
South Africa began working on fortiﬁcation 
several years before the initiative and is now fortifying 
most ﬂour, but this is a single country with large, 
modern ﬂour mills.
Across the region, the number of participating 
ﬂour mills doubled during 2003–2005 and 
remained stable (Figure 2.5).
Quality of Fortiﬁed Foods 
Delivering safe, quality fortiﬁed foods to consumers 
requires an elaborate QAC system. One of the 
initiative’s challenges was to establish such a system 
in each country, according to a QAC framework 
recommended by the Pan American Health 
Organization (Figure 2.6).19
The QAC system needed internal control by the 
producers and external control by the governments’ 
inspection agencies, and often by consumer groups, 
at each stage of fortiﬁcation and delivery, as well as 
technical capacity at reference laboratories, food 
producers, and government inspection agencies. Also, 
the initiative quickly discovered a need to improve 
Figure 2.5: Number of Participating Flour Mills
in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007
Note: Involved mills have ofﬁcially committed to fortifying ﬂour; active mills have 
ofﬁcially committed to and are actually fortifying ﬂour.
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia. 
Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country 
project reports.
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19 Further details on QAC mechanisms for ﬂour fortiﬁcation are available in ADB. 2009. Promoting Wheat Flour Fortiﬁcation in Central 
Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. Experiences of Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. 
Manila. Available: www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Consultant/37721-REG/37721-REG-TACR.pdf
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border control of imported salt, as the countries 
proceeded to ban importing noniodized salt.
The initiative provided laboratory equipment 
and necessary reagents as well as training for 
laboratory and sanitary epidemiological service 
(SES) technicians, which are inspecting agencies in 
the custom ofﬁces of Central Asian countries. 
Iodized salt in ﬁnal product form should contain 
at least 15 ppm of iodine. The initiative helped 
governments update salt iodization standards to 
conform to this standard, and helped the countries 
in their QAC activities. The QAC for iodized salt 
was carried out at production sites, retail shops, 
markets, and households. SESs regularly inspected 
salt produced and, in some cases, salt sold at markets. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, however, SESs were allowed 
to inspect food producers only once a year, which 
is insufﬁcient for enforcing quality standards. More 
than 42,000 samples from production sites and about 
745,000 samples at retail shops and households 
were tested in 2003–2004 alone, using different test 
methods—titration, WYD iodine checkers,20 and salt 
test kits. The results varied depending on the method 
used. Thus, strict comparisons between 2003 and 
2004, or between results at production sites, retail 
shops, and households, are not possible. In general, 
the data showed that the majority of samples had 
adequate iodine level at production sites. 
Figure 2.6: Pan American Health Organization Guidelines on Quality 
Assurance and Control for Food Fortiﬁcation
*Fortified Food Products (100%)
(Retail Stores)
*Imported Food
Products
Imported Food Locally Produced
Food
Food VehicleNutrient Premix
*Fortified Food Products
*Fortified Food Products (100%)
(Producers’ Warehouses)
*Fortified Food Products (100%)
(Large Warehouses)
*Fortified Food Products (100%)
(Home/Small Industries)
Home Surveillance
Quality Control (Factories)
Inspection “Confidence” Assays
Monitoring (State)
Monitoring “Confidence” Assays
(State, Provincial, and Local
Authorities)
Monitoring
(Consumers, Local Authorities)
Certification of Conformity
from Exporting Countries
(Customs Authorities)
“Confidence” Assays
(State)
Quality Auditing
Rejection or
Application of
Penalties
Acceptance
* = Packed and Labeled
() = Responsible Parties
Recommended Quality Assurance and Quality
Control System for Food Fortification
Certification (State)
Adapted from: Food and Nutrition Program, Division of Health Promotion and Protection, Pan American Health Organization.
20 Hand-held instruments that measure the salt iodine content.
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Kazakhstan and Mongolia were able to maintain 
adequate iodine levels from production sites to 
retailers and households, but in other countries salt 
tested at retailers and households had less iodine 
than did salt at production sites. This indicated 
not only improper packaging and storage (without 
which iodine content gradually declines), but also 
the fact that noniodized or poorly iodized salt was 
still available in the market from illegal sources that 
were not inspected by the SESs and that some people 
still used free salt from nearby salt deposits.
Flour fortiﬁcation quality was tested by the 
iron spot test, which is a simple and semiqualitative 
procedure used all over the world to check whether 
a ﬂour sample has roughly the right amount of 
added iron. That, in turn, denotes whether the ﬂour 
is being properly fortiﬁed. Most tests were done by 
laboratories in the ﬂour mills.
Each country handled external quality control 
of fortiﬁed ﬂour differently, with KAN providing 
product testing for all the countries. Kazakhstan and 
Mongolia designed and adopted the procedures for 
monitoring of production, import, and sale of the 
fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour, whereas the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan worked from existing 
sanitary regulations and norms.
In general, procedures included control on 
(i) compliance of the fortiﬁcants (and/or premix) 
with the existing standards,
(ii) adequacy of the ﬂour fortiﬁcation method, 
(iii) vitamin and mineral content in the ﬁnal 
product, and
(iv) compliance of the packaging and labeling with 
existing standards. 
For external monitoring, Uzbekistan used the central 
Uzdonmakhsulot Milling group in Uzbekistan and 
SES laboratories; Kazakhstan used the League of 
Grain Processors and Bakers of Kazakhstan and the 
SES. The Kyrgyz Republic relied on the Independent 
Bread Inspection Laboratory, Mongolia relied on 
Special Governmental Inspection, and Tajikistan 
relied on a private laboratory that had a contract with 
the association of food producers in Tajikistan. 
Only Uzbekistan routinely ran quantitative iron 
and niacin tests using sophisticated equipment. These 
were done early in the initiative by the American 
Ingredients Company (which was a competitively 
selected supplier of the premix), KAN, and the 
SES.
Beginning results showed erratic levels of 
minerals in fortiﬁed ﬂour samples, consistent with 
expectations for any new program and the level of 
milling technology used in Central Asia. Much of 
the variation came from erratic ﬂow of ﬂour through 
the mill. The problem was mostly underfortiﬁcation. 
Occasional spikes of overfortiﬁcation would not have 
caused any safety alarm for human intake because 
the fortiﬁcation standards were set low enough. 
The accuracy of both mill dosing and 
quantitative testing was expected to improve with 
experience. International experts concluded that, 
until the matter was resolved, spot tests were the 
best method of quality testing for emerging ﬂour 
fortiﬁcation programs, and have modiﬁed their 
advice to other countries accordingly.
Affordability of Fortiﬁed Foods 
At the beginning of the initiative, many consumers 
complained that iodized salt was much more 
expensive than noniodized salt, making it unlikely 
that the poor would buy iodized salt. Country 
project ofﬁces (CPOs) regularly checked prices of 
iodized salt in the market. Observations showed that 
by the end of the ﬁrst JFPR project, the price of 
iodized salt came down as production increased, and 
the complaint about the high price disappeared. The 
problem remained, however, in some pockets around 
open salt deposits in Mongolia and Tajikistan, from 
which people took salt freely. 
Indeed, producers were more worried about 
costs than consumers. Millers and bakers faced a 
signiﬁcant up-front charge, especially for the ﬂour 
premix. Experience in other countries suggested that 
the industry might resist ﬂour fortiﬁcation if its cost 
exceeded $1 per ton of ﬂour. Experience had also 
shown that the premix accounted for about 90% of 
the cost of fortiﬁcation, so the project’s goal was to 
keep the fortiﬁcation cost at around $0.90 per ton.
The ﬁnal cost to the mill turned out to be $0.97 
per ton of ﬂour when added at 150 grams per ton, 
or $0.78 per ton when added at 120 grams per ton 
as later recommended for ﬁrst-grade ﬂour. By 2008, 
the cost of the premix had increased to about $1.10 
per ton of ﬂour, but the price of ﬂour had more than 
doubled by then, decreasing the proportional cost of 
fortiﬁcation.
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Private Sector Investment
The mandatory nature of salt iodization, prescribed 
by all participating countries by the end of the 
initiative, meant that there was a level playing 
ﬁeld for the salt industries. Thus, all producers 
had to include fortiﬁcant at the standard rate. This 
helped them overcome earlier fears about increased 
production costs, which, in any case, were to be 
passed on to consumers.
In contrast, ﬂour fortiﬁcation, being the ﬁrst 
large-scale trial in the region, needed time to prove 
its efﬁcacy and remained voluntary in most of 
the countries. All participating countries started 
working toward mandatory ﬂour fortiﬁcation in the 
last 2 years of the initiative. By November 2009, 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic had mandatory 
ﬂour fortiﬁcation legislation.
As the initiative progressed, the participating 
producers of both salt and ﬂour increased their 
investments in fortiﬁcation, not only in the fortiﬁcant 
(which was initially subsidized), processing, and 
packaging, but also in contributions to strengthening 
testing laboratories, training personnel, and social 
marketing. This trend is shown for fortiﬁed salt 
in Figure 2.7. The cost of ﬂour fortiﬁcation was 
about 0.5% of total processing costs and resulted 
in a barely noticeable increase in cost to the ﬁnal 
consumers.
Since the end of 2007, a private company 
in Kazakhstan has been producing premix in 
Kazakhstan. Regional capacity for premix production 
helps easy procurement by Central Asian countries. 
Legal and Regulatory Framework
Common Fortiﬁcation Standards
The initiative aimed at and, to a large extent, 
achieved establishing a set of uniﬁed (or harmonized) 
national laws, regulations, and standards to 
(i) ensure the essential quality of the fortiﬁed foods, 
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Figure 2.7: Share of Grant and Private Industry Costs of Iodized Salt 
Production in Central Asia and Mongolia in 2001–2007 ($)
JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, UNICEF = United Nations Children’s Fund.
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia 
Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country project 
reports.
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(ii) protect the consumer from fraud, (iii) provide 
the legal authority an adequate legal framework for 
the food-control activities, and (iv) strengthen the 
incentives for food producers and traders for cross-
border and countrywide trade of fortiﬁed foods. A 
catalog of laws and regulations adopted during the 
initiative is shown in Appendix 5. 
Under the umbrella of the initiative, all the 
participating countries agreed on a set of standards 
and made regulations and laws accordingly. 
Adoption of common standards took place in about 
2 years—an impressive achievement. No one had 
attempted a uniform set of fortiﬁcation standards for 
this large region before, except in Central America. 
A single premix and uniform set of fortiﬁed ﬂour 
standards should be used, rather than allowing each 
country to set up its own standards and premix, and 
it required all the participating countries to write 
their regulations and laws accordingly. Common 
standards simpliﬁed procurement of fortiﬁcants and 
helped reduce cost. They also helped free trade of 
fortiﬁed salt and ﬂour within the region.
Universal Salt Iodization Laws
One of the initiative’s biggest achievements was 
having all participating countries adopt universal salt 
iodization (USI) laws during its term.21 The initiative 
helped the countries develop and adopt the laws and 
regulations required to enforce USI. The laws provide 
a level playing ﬁeld for all producers, while holding 
them accountable for production of iodized salt and 
preventing import of noniodized salt. 
Some countries had laws on salt iodization that 
were incomplete and allowed import of noniodized 
salt. These were amended during the project. In 
Mongolia, 10 food fortiﬁcation standards, the 
National Strategy on Prevention of IDA, and the 
Law on Salt Iodization and Prevention of IDD 
were approved, and the National Program on 
Prevention of IDD was revised. Tajikistan’s law, 
however, contained a loophole prohibiting the 
sale of noniodized salt while allowing production 
of noniodized salt. This made it difﬁcult to hold 
producers accountable.
Mandatory Flour Fortiﬁcation Laws
Flour fortiﬁcation began on a voluntary basis in all 
the participating countries, and they worked toward 
making it mandatory. Although some national 
projects elsewhere began with a mandatory program 
(e.g., Indonesia, Ghana), this was not possible in 
Central Asia. An initial voluntary period was needed 
to allow the milling industry and consuming public 
to become familiar with fortiﬁcation of a food staple 
and then to accept it, and also to demonstrate the 
efﬁcacy of fortiﬁed ﬂour. 
Most aspects of ﬂour and bread production 
were under centralized government control 
during the Soviet period. Technical standards, 
procedures, and speciﬁcations for ﬂour production 
were inherited by the emerging Central Asian 
countries, which made changing regulations to 
allow fortiﬁcation of ﬂour and bread a slow and 
difﬁcult process. The lack of relevant international 
expertise on fortiﬁcation meant it was necessary to 
design new legislation, which delayed enactment 
of the enabling regulations. The ﬁrst task was to 
set up regulations to allow fortiﬁcation equipment 
and premix to be brought into the countries, 
preferably with reduced or eliminated tariffs and 
taxes. Most countries were still working toward 
legislation for mandatory ﬂour fortiﬁcation at the 
end of the initiative. The President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic approved legislation on mandatory ﬂour 
fortiﬁcation in March 2009.
In Kazakhstan, wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation was 
once mandatory but was changed to voluntary 
in 2007 in response to political pressure from the 
ministries of agriculture and trade. Nevertheless, 
most of the participating ﬂour mills (14 of 16) 
continued fortiﬁed-ﬂour production, although the 
amounts remained less than needed. KAN and the 
League of Grain Processors and Bakers of Kazakhstan 
started to design provisional company regulations 
on fortiﬁcation. Kazakhstan made ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
mandatory again in September 2009.
In contrast to the achievements described above, 
little progress was made in promoting regional 
trade in fortiﬁed ﬂour. Inadequate infrastructure, 
21 Uzbekistan is the only country that did not adopt a USI law during the ﬁrst project. Thus, adoption of the law was a condition for 
Uzbekistan to participate in the second project. Uzbekistan ﬁnally approved the law in 2007.
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resource constraints, and weak institutions remain 
barriers to realizing greater beneﬁts from increased 
trade in fortiﬁed foods. To dramatically improve 
the availability of fortiﬁed ﬂour, it would be more 
efﬁcient and practical for some countries to import 
fortiﬁed ﬂour instead of importing wheat from 
Kazakhstan and trying to fortify it domestically. 
Advocacy, Communication,  
and Mobilization
The countries adopted USI legislation and other 
important regulations because of extensive advocacy 
by the initiative. Through marketing activities, 
the participating countries obtained the support 
of decision makers and other stakeholders down 
to community members. Coordinating each tier 
of communication activities, from policy level to 
community level, ensured that the right messages 
were available at the right time.
Sometimes the countries’ advocacy achievements 
were diminished by changes made by decision 
makers, and also by counterattacks from interest 
groups. The experience taught that advocacy efforts 
must be continuous in order to maintain political 
support for food fortiﬁcation.
Television (TV), radio, newspapers, and even 
technical literature promoted nutrition education 
and the advantages of fortiﬁed food. In Kazakhstan, 
the Ministry of Culture and Public Information 
funded regular broadcasting of fortiﬁed food 
advocacy telecasts by national public TV channels. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, private TV companies gave 
free broadcasting time for fortiﬁed food advocacy 
materials. In Mongolia, the initiative supported a 
documentary on food fortiﬁcation activities, which 
was shown at prime viewing time on national TV 
channels. In Mongolia and Uzbekistan, regular TV 
lessons were designed with the help of nutritionists 
and journalists. In the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, 
and Tajikistan, the popular broadcasting channels 
transmitted messages on the beneﬁts of fortiﬁed 
food. In all, the media coverage of fortiﬁcation 
issues totaled 90 telecasts, nearly 150 articles in 
newspapers and magazines, and about 60 academic 
publications during the initiative.
Motivating the key players in fortiﬁcation was a 
major task. Numerous nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs), ofﬁcials, and volunteers spent many hours 
in activities supporting the initiative in communities 
and sometimes at much higher levels, often with 
no compensation. It helped to involve the players 
in producing communication support materials. 
Mongolia was especially good at involving a wide 
range of experts and overseeing their professional 
contributions in developing materials. The most 
impressive were technical books for physicians, a 
technical manual on fortiﬁcation, and manuals on 
quality assurance. Materials developed within the 
initiative have been used in orienting other groups, 
ranging from medical and health staff throughout 
the country to workers in ﬂour and salt production, 
and pre-service educators. 
Testing with salt test kits became a powerful 
social mobilization tool, involving health workers, 
school children, retailers, consumer associations, and 
NGOs. The best example was in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
where the Red Cross started a mass campaign on 
salt testing in Naryn oblast. Communities tested 
salt; if it was found to be noniodized, they sent it 
back to the producers and demanded replacements. 
The initiative expanded the mass campaign to 
other oblasts, together with another ADB-ﬁnanced 
project, the Community-Based Early Childhood 
Development Project. In some cases, salt industries 
were closed down by government order for producing 
noniodized salt.
The initiative created a “healthy food” logo 
(shown below), which was adopted by all participating 
countries as part of the packaging or labeling. The 
initiative also supported food fortiﬁcation advocacy 
based on the logo, which helped marketing efforts 
of the participating food industries. Logo use by 
food producers is usually regulated by each country’s 
associations of food producers. 
Also, Russian-language and English-language 
websites were set up to provide reference material 
and project information to stakeholders.
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Each country demonstrated good practices in 
organizational motivation. For example:
• Retail salt sellers in the Kyrgyz Republic became 
much more active selling iodized salt after they 
became involved in testing their salt for iodate 
content. 
• Technicians at a ﬂour mill in Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia, refabricated a broken gear in a feeder 
to quickly bring fortiﬁed ﬂour production back 
on line. One ﬂour mill purchased its own micro-
feeder and others requested technical assistance 
in locating such equipment. 
• A mill in Astana, Kazakhstan, independently 
carried out a major marketing effort for fortiﬁed 
ﬂour when project social marketing activities 
were delayed. 
Kazakhstan was an early leader in awareness 
campaigning (Box 2.1). 
There was also campaigning opposing 
fortiﬁcation. Box 2.2 relates how opposition from 
just one organization or inﬂuential individual can 
cause setbacks and cripple months or years worth 
of work.
Capacity Development
Rather than relying on foreign or international 
expertise, the initiative developed a cadre of trained 
personnel in both the public and private sectors in 
the participating countries. This approach partly 
explains initial delays in project implementation, 
but it helped forge strong ownership by participating 
As soon as Kazakhstan’s national fortiﬁcation plan was in place, the Kazakh Academy of 
Nutrition, along with the Healthy Life-Style Promotion Center and selected public relations 
ﬁrms, produced educational and communications materials about iodine deﬁciency disor-
ders (IDD) and anemia prevention for pretesting in small focus-group interviews with their 
speciﬁc target groups. After adjustment, the materials were tested during the second half of 
2003 in pilot areas of South Kazakhstan oblast. The campaign also included TV features, 
press conferences, presentations, and training seminars for nongovernment organization 
(NGO) employees, mass media, and salt and ﬂour product dealers.
The message about the preventive effect of using iodized salt was aimed at large popula-
tion groups, using the resources of the health care and education sectors, the mass media of 
the region, and NGOs. The campaign delivered numerous sets of 12 kinds of printed and 
video products about iodized salt with speciﬁc messages to the target audiences: local author-
ities; salt enterprises and traders; state employees in primary health care and sanitary services; 
middle schools, colleges, and universities; young school children, teenagers, and pregnant 
women; mass-media workers; and the general public. Especially in rural areas, these groups 
were enlightened about the dangers of iodine deﬁciency and the desirability of consuming 
iodized salt, educated in the principles of iodized salt storage and use during cooking, and 
informed about the “Healthy Food/Sapaldy Azdyk” general trademark.
At the end of 2003, assisted by the initiative and the Kyrgyz Red Cross, monitoring sur-
veys and population interviews were conducted on the quality of iodized salt among 91,000 
rural and urban households in South Kazakhstan oblast. The results indicated that awareness 
of IDD and use of iodized salt among the population had improved from 43% to 61%. 
Virtually all respondents had heard about iodized salt and knew the advantages of using it. 
Only 3% of households were still using noniodized salt. These results formed the basis of a 
comprehensive national campaign during 2003–2004, with a follow-up stage that continued 
into 2006.
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Universal Salt Iodization in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. Experiences of 
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. Manila.
Box 2.1: Kazakhstan’s Successful Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders Awareness Campaign
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countries and country project ofﬁces (CPOs), 
and improved their capacity development. It also 
promoted centers of excellence, such as the Kazakh 
Academy of Nutrition (KAN), in these countries, 
helping to create a solid and broad foundation for 
sustained food fortiﬁcation in the region.
Salt and Flour Processors
The initiative helped improve the production 
systems for fortiﬁed salt and ﬂour by providing 
feeders, packaging equipment, and initial supplies 
of fortiﬁcants to participating salt industries 
and ﬂour mills. It supported technical assistance 
among producers by (i) helping form producers’ 
associations, which became active in solving 
the technical problems of individual producers; 
(ii) training industry personnel; and (iii) designing 
and lobbying for legislation, regulations, and 
standards. By the end of the ﬁrst project, some 
milling consultants started assisting millers in other 
participating countries. 
The initiative further ensured adequate training 
of technical staff through national and regional 
workshops. These provided practical guidance on the 
national legislation and regulations, while regional 
training focused on international best practices in 
fortiﬁcation. These training events are summarized 
in Figures 2.8 and 2.9.
The initiative also worked to strengthen 
associations of salt producers and ﬂour mills. All 
participating countries had associations, except 
Uzbekistan where ﬂour mills were partly government-
owned joint-stock companies. Associations were 
provided with quality-monitoring equipment by 
the project to help their member food producers, 
and were trained in installing equipment. The 
associations in the participating countries were 
relatively weak, and their capacity varied by country. 
Tajikistan’s association has continued to manage a 
revolving potassium iodate fund for its members 
even after the initiative’s support ended, while the 
Kyrgyz salt association’s work slowed down when 
it had a change of leader. The League of Grain 
Processors and Bakers of Kazakhstan is relatively 
strong and advocated for establishing a regional ﬂour 
mill association towards the end of the initiative, 
which was generally welcomed by associations in the 
other countries. Such a regional association would 
surely contribute to promote ﬂour fortiﬁcation in 
the region.
UNICEF, in cooperation with the CDC, 
conducted regular training on quality assurance 
and monitoring of iodized salt in all the countries 
throughout 2004–2007. Also, UNICEF, in 
cooperation with the International Association 
of Operating Millers, the CDC, and the Flour 
Kazakhstan passed mandatory ﬂour fortiﬁcation legislation in October 2004 but re-
scinded it in 2007, primarily because of trade issues and resistance from some mill-
ers. A major ﬂaw of the 2004 ﬂour fortiﬁcation law was that it did not have strong 
involvement or support of the milling industry. The National Fortiﬁcation Alliance, 
in particular the Kazakh Academy of Nutrition as a key member of the alliance, used 
its inﬂuence to get the law passed. One motivation in pushing for rapid passage of the 
law was the hope of winning a grant from the Global Alliance for Improving Nutri-
tion. When a grant was subsequently declined for the second time, some industry and 
government support for a mandatory law was lost. There was also strong opposition 
from the minister of agriculture. However, Kazakhstan made ﬂour fortiﬁcation man-
datory again in September 2009.
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Wheat Flour Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. 
Experiences of Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. 
Manila.
Box 2.2: Opposition to Mandatory Flour Fortiﬁcation 
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Figure 2.8: Numbers of Salt Engineers and Laboratory Technicians 
Trained in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia Implementation 
Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country project reports.
Figure 2.9: Numbers of Flour Mill Engineers and Laboratory  
Technicians Trained in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2003–2007
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia. 
Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country project 
reports.
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Fortiﬁcation Initiative, conducted regular training 
on quality assurance and monitoring of fortiﬁed 
ﬂour in all the participating countries through 
regional meetings of the International Association 
of Operating Millers and national workshops.
Regulatory Authorities
The initiative increased the capacity of government 
control agencies to ensure adequate tests of fortiﬁed 
food samples through procurement of laboratory 
equipment and reagents. More than 4,000 
representatives from the sanitary epidemiological 
services (SESs), customs services, and other 
control agencies were trained at national and local 
workshops. Around 28,000 salt test indicators 
were distributed among NGOs and retailers to 
monitor salt iodization in markets and households. 
In Mongolia, as a result of institutional reform, the 
Specialized Inspection Agency was established in 
2006; in other participating countries, regulatory 
control is through interaction between the standards 
agency, the SES, and the customs service. Figure 
2.10 provides an overview of the training events and 
capacity building for the various control agencies.
The regional workshops and training by 
the CDC and UNICEF constituted a powerful 
capacity development exercise for the region. These 
organizations provided the framework for project 
development in all the countries, set the stage for 
regional cooperation, and provided necessary skills 
in project activities. 
Nongovernment Organizations
Many NGOs beneﬁted from their active roles 
in awareness building and social marketing. In 
Mongolia, for example, organizations such as 
the Mongolian Women’s Federation, Consumer 
Rights Protection Association, Mongolian Medical 
Academy, and Family Education Association 
played leading roles in these activities, along with 
participating private companies. All were encouraged 
by the population’s reaction to their efforts and 
believe that their reputation among the communities 
grew as a result of their involvement in the initiative. 
At the same time, the experiences made them more 
capable of sustaining the fortiﬁcation program in 
their country.
Figure 2.10: Numbers of Staff of Control Agencies Trained in Central 
Asia and Mongolia in 2003–2007
Source: ADB. 2008. Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia. 
Implementation Completion Report. Consultant’s report. Manila. Data source: country project 
reports.
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3. Development Impact
Reduced Prevalence of Iodine  
Deﬁciency and Iron Deﬁciency 
The adoption of universal salt iodization (USI) by all 
the participating countries, the rising production of 
iodized salt, and the growing number of households 
using iodized salt during the initiative indicate 
increased protection against IDD. 
Initiative results show that almost 24 million new 
consumers of iodized salt were added in the population 
of Central Asia and Mongolia during the ﬁrst Japan 
Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) project, and an 
additional 500,000 newborns were protected against 
brain damage from iodine deﬁciency.
A simple scenario calculation by Frits Van Der 
Haar of Emory University suggests that the annual 
savings to the combined national economies as a 
result of the initiative may have been as high as $300 
million. Table 3.1 gives country details of these data, 
and Figure 3.1 shows progress in the protection of 
newborns. The iodized salt coverage data were the 
latest data available as of 2000, 2004, and 2006. 
They may not be perfectly accurate but are the best 
data available.
The data show that, regionwide, the proportion 
of newborns protected against iodine-deﬁciency-
caused brain damage increased 25% in 2000 to 
59% in 2004 and to 63% in 2006. This means that, 
annually, 500,000 more newborns were protected 
due to the initiative’s efforts than before the initiative 
began.
Figure 3.1: Number of Newborns Protected Each Year against the Risk of 
Brain Damage from Iodine Deﬁciency, 2000–2006
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Universal Salt Iodization in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. 
Experiences of Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. 
Manila.
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Table 3.1: Estimated Impact of Iodization on Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders Prevention 
Population
(millions) Percent of House-
holds Using Iodized 
Salt
Annual Births
(‘000)
Protected 
Against Per 1,000 Total Numbers Numbers
Country Total IDD % Year Population Number Protected Unprotected
Initiative Countries, end 2000a
Azerbaijan 7.7 3.3 43 2000 15 115 49 65
Kazakhstan 14.9 4.3 29 1999 14 207 60 147
Kyrgyz Republic 4.9 1.3 27 1997 22 109 30 79
Mongolia 2.5 1.1 45 1998 20 51 23 28
Tajikistan 6.4 1.3 20 2000 21 134 27 107
Uzbekistan 24.8 4.7 19 2000 23 570 108 462
 Total 61.2 16.0 26 … … 1,186 297 888
  
Initiative Countries, 2004
Azerbaijanb 8.2 5.7 70 2004 14 115 80 34
Kazakhstanb 15.4 12.8 83 2004 17 262 218 44
Kyrgyz Republicc 5.1 3.0 59 2003 21 108 64 44
Mongoliac 2.6 1.9 75 2004 23 60 45 15
Tajikistanc 6.2 1.7 28 2003 31 194 54 139
Uzbekistanc 26.1 14.6 56 2003 23 600 335 265
 Total 63.6 39.7 63 … … 1,339 796 541
Initiative Countries, 2006 Situationd
Kazakhstan 15.3 14.1 92 2006 18 275 253 22
Kyrgyz Republic 5.2 4.0 76 2006 21 109 83 26
Mongolia 2.6 1.9 75 2005 18 47 35 12
Tajikistan 7.0 3.2 46 2005 30 210 97 113
Uzbekistan 26.2 13.9 53 2006 23 603 320 283
 Total 56.3 37.1 66 … … 1,244 788 456
Note: Numbers may not sum precisely because of rounding.
a  Data from ADB Salt Situation Assessments; UNICEF; Population size and crude birth rates from UN Population Reference Bureau reports for 
the respective years.
b Data from UNICEF; Population sizes and crude birth rates from the UN Population Reference Bureau reports for the respective years.
c Data from Beijing Conference in 2003.
d Data from multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICSs) in late 2005 and early 2006.
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Universal Salt Iodization in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. Experiences of Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. Manila.
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The initiative conducted sentinel studies, 
coordinated by KAN, on the effects of both salt 
and ﬂour fortiﬁcation on women and children in 
each country in pilot areas: a baseline study in 2003 
(December 2002–April 2003), a 1-year follow-up 
study in 2004 (May–August 2004), and a 4-year 
follow-up study in 2007). The results for the major 
iodine-related indicators are summarized in Table 
3.2, and for the IDA-related and folic-acid-related 
indicators in Table 3.3.
Comparing the 2003 and 2004 data for children 
shows the immediate effect of the increases in iodized 
salt supplies on the iodine status of children in all 
countries except Mongolia (Table 3.2). The values for 
Table 3.2: Urinary Iodine Measurements in Children 2–15 Years of Age and Women 15–49 Years of Age,  
by Country
Variable Yeara Azerbaijanb Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz 
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Children 2–15 Years: Comparative Data 
Urine Iodine/Iodine Deﬁciency (ID)
Median (μg/L) 2003 154.7 104.5 78.8 68.8 29.1 109.3
2004 308.1 246.8 133.4 58.6 94.2 246.8
2007 323.5 187.9 … 118.6 119.8 136.8
ID, total (%) 2003 10.0 48.8 67.5 63.8 88.8 47.7
2004 0.0 7.5 25.0 63.8 56.2
2007 1.3c 16.2c … 43.0c 34.3c 28.6
Mild 2003 7.5 28.8 37.3 27.5 16.3 16.3
2004 … 7.5 18.1 20 45.2
2007 1.3 12.1 … 31.7 31.4 20.2
Moderate 2003 1.3 12.5 13.3 26.3 42.5 14.0
2004 … 2.8 33.8 11.0 …
2007 4.1 … 11.4 2.9 8.3
Severe 2003 1.3 7.5 16.9 10.0 30.0 17.4
2004 … 4.2 10.0 … …
2007 … … … … …
Women 15–49 Years: Comparative Data 
Median, total (μg/L) 2004 315.0 213.7 116.8 72.0 98.3 205.4
2007 334.3 222.7 … 112.4 130.4 134.3
ID, total (%) 2004 2.5 15.4 30.8 60.0 54.5 5.0
2007 2.0 19.4 … 40.0 19.3c 25.7
Mild 2004 2.6 5.1 20.5 27.5 40.9 5.1
2007 2.0 11.1 … 20.0 16.1 22.8
Moderate 2004 … 2.6 5.15 25.0 4.5 0.0
2007 … 8.3 … 17.5 3.2 2.9
Severe 2004 … 7.7 5.15 7.5 9.1 …
2007 … … … 2.5 … …
μg/L = micrograms per liter.
a  Women were not included in baseline data; round 1 in Kazakhstan was carried out in December 2002, and 2002 data for this country are in 
the 2003 lines.
b Round 3 in Azerbaijan was carried out in 2005, and 2005 data for this country are in 2007 lines. 
c sp < 0.05 in comparison with baseline data (for children) or with round 2 data (for women). (p = probability of rejection of hypothesis.)
children in 2007 indicate that the improvements were 
sustained, and by then included Mongolia. Results for 
women were similar. The urinary iodine indicators 
for 2004 and 2007 show sustained improvements 
in women’s iodine status, accompanied by the salt 
measurements, which suggest continuing improved 
access to adequately iodized salt between 2004 and 
2007 in the sentinel sites. 
UNICEF sponsored two national surveys near 
the end of the initiative—one in Kazakhstan in 
2006 and the other in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2007. 
The surveys assessed the quality and use of iodized 
salt in households and the iodine nutrition status of 
a representative sample of the population.
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In Kazakhstan, iodine status reached an optimal 
level in 2005, and compared to similar data collected 
in 1999 showed that the outstanding improvement 
of iodine status in the population was associated with 
signiﬁcant improvements in the use and quality of 
iodized salt in households—more than 90% of the 
sampled households were using adequately iodized 
salt.
The Kyrgyz Republic survey conﬁrmed that 
much progress was achieved in improving the 
iodized salt supply and iodine nutrition status in the 
population, but revealed that pregnant women (not 
sampled in the Kazakhstan survey) were still not 
consuming enough iodine to satisfy their increased 
dietary iodine requirements.
Wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation resulted in signiﬁcant 
improvement in the micronutrient status of children 
and women in households where fortiﬁed ﬂour 
was regularly consumed, according to the sentinel 
studies carried out during 2001–2007 (Table 3.3). 
While the studies were limited to a small group in 
each country, the reduction in anemia rates and 
severe folic acid deﬁciency were good evidence of the 
efﬁcacy of the ﬂour fortiﬁcation. The detailed results 
have been published separately.22 In summary:
• Most of the women in the sample population 
were aware of fortiﬁed ﬂour and most said they 
were using it. 
• By 2007, the iron spot test showed that the 
ﬂour used by most households (83%–100%) in 
all countries was fortiﬁed.
• Baseline data showed high initial rates of anemia 
in children and women, similar by country to 
World Health Organization (WHO) data.
• Overall anemia rates dropped from 42% to 34% 
in women and from 35% to 22% in children.
• Ferritin levels increased in both children and 
women, showing improvement in iron store 
status. The overall incidence of low ferritin 
levels in women dropped from 42% to 24%. 
• Serum folate levels increased in both women 
and children. The overall level of severe folic 
acid deﬁciency dropped from 39% to 2% in 
children and from 13% to 2% in women.
Production and consumption of fortiﬁed wheat 
ﬂour across the participating countries remain low. 
However, the practice of ﬂour fortiﬁcation has 
been ﬁrmly established in the region. While the 
amount of fortiﬁed ﬂour being produced is low in 
comparison to total ﬂour consumption, it is clearly 
making a valuable nutritional contribution to those 
people who consume it.
Flour fortiﬁcation would need to be greatly 
expanded to achieve a measurable effect for the 
general population. Assessing the effect on IDA 
would be the hardest task, because this condition is 
inﬂuenced by a number of dietary factors apart from 
iron intake. Also, it takes years for improvement to 
occur and become statistically signiﬁcant. A decrease 
in neural tube birth defects through reduction of 
folic acid deﬁciency would likely occur the fastest, 
based on experience in other countries. 
Overall, the initiative’s efforts are helping avert 
human capital and economic loss as discussed in the 
introduction.
22  S. Tazhibayev, et al. 2008. Evaluation of the Potential Effectiveness of Wheat Flour and Salt Fortiﬁcation Programs in Five Central 
Asian Countries and Mongolia, 2002–2007. UN Food and Nutrition Bulletin. 29 (4). pp. 255–265.
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Table 3.3: Anemia, Ferritin, and Folic Acid Measurements in Children and Women, by Country
Variable Yeara Azerbaijanb Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz  
Republicc Mongolia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Children 2–15 Years: Comparative Data 
Anemia (%) 
Total 2003 20.9 50.0 15.0 12.5 70.0 31.4
2004 25.0 37.5 7.9 8.8 24.1 10.5
2007 6.3* 32.4* 7.9 20.3 20.3* 16.7*
Mild 2003 18.6 38.8 13.8 12.5 40.0 29.1
2004 23.7 33.8 7.9 8.8 20.3 10.5
2007 6.3* 25.7 … 19.0 17.4 16.7
Moderate 2003 2.3 11.2 1.2 … 27.5 2.3
2004 1.3 3.8 … … 3.8 …
2007 … 6.8 … 1.3 2.9 …
Severe 2003 … … … … 2.5 …
2004 … … … … … …
2007 … … … … … …
Low ferritin 
level (%) 2003 15.2 43.8 4.9 5.0 8.7 8.1
2004 48.7 53.8 51.2 52.5 47.4 5.1
2007 16.3 22.9* 51.2 16.4 12.9 22.6
Folic acid  
deﬁciency (%) 
Total 2003 85.0 83.3 97.6 85.0 57.5 16.2
2004 51.9 83.8 68.8 57.5 69.2 7.7
2007 16.3* 18.9* 68.8 41.8* 4.4* 12.0
Mild 2003 28.8 20.5 13.4 47.5 21.3 10.5
2004 29.1 56.3 32.5 27.5 33.3 6.4
2007 12.5 18.7 32.5 39.3 2.9 10.8
Severe 2003 56.3 62.8 84.2 37.5 36.3 5.8
2004 22.8 27.5 36.4 30.0 35.9 1.3
2007 3.8 … 36.4 2.5 1.5 1.2
continued on next page
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Variable Yeara Azerbaijanb Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz  
Republicc Mongolia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Women 15–49 Years: Comparative Data
Anemia (%)
Total 2004 69.2 57.5 33.3 10.0 33.3 51.3
2007 50.0 27.8* … 25.0 37.1 27.8
Mild 2004 64.1 45.0 30.8 7.5 28.2 43.6
2007 47.5 19.4 … 22.5 37.1 16.7
Moderate 2004 5.1 10.0 2.6 2.5 5.1 7.7
2007 2.5 8.3 … 2.5 … 11.1
Severe 2004 … 2.5 … … … …
Low ferritin 
level (%) 2004 50.0 47.4 47.6 25.0 43.6 28.2
2007 20.0* 25.0 52.6 20.0 22.8* 33.3
Folic acid  
deﬁciency (%) 
Total 2004 12.8 65.0 59.0 75.0 30.8 33.3
2007 10.0 33.3 … 37.5* 17.2 24.1
Mild 2004 12.8 42.5 28.2 60.0 12.8 30.8
2007 10.0 33.3 … 32.5 14.3 24.1
Severe 2004 0.0 22.5 30.8 15.0 17.9 2.6
2007 … … … 5.0 2.9 …
sp < 0.05 in comparison with baseline data (for children) or with round 2 data (for women).
a  Women were not included in baseline data; round 1 in Kazakhstan was carried out in December 2002, and 2002 data for this country are in 
the 2003 lines. 
b Round 3 in Azerbaijan was carried out in 2005, and 2005 data for this country are in 2007 lines. 
c Round 3 in the Kyrgyz Republic was not carried out, and round 2 data for this country, which was conducted in 2004, are in the 2007 lines. 
Table 3.3 continued
4.  Development Issues, Lessons 
Learned, and Conclusion
Development Issues
As noted earlier, the initiative tested three main 
hypotheses: that public–private partnership 
can succeed in countries newly emerging from 
centralized economies, that fortiﬁed foods can be 
made affordable to the poor, and that a regional 
versus a country-by-country approach adds value to 
each country. The development results are discussed 
below.
Would Public–Private Partnership toward 
Sustainable Food Fortiﬁcation Work 
in Countries Newly Emerging from 
Centralized Economies? 
In most Central Asian countries, private industry 
was still emerging a decade after independence. 
Governments were grappling with degrees of control 
over private companies; the well-established networks 
of trade, communication, and energy supply among 
the former Soviet republics had largely disappeared. 
The reemergence of iodine deﬁciency disorders 
(IDD) was but one result of this fracturing.
Participating salt industries and ﬂour mills signed 
agreements with their country’s health ministry that 
stipulated their responsibilities in detail, including 
sharing one-third of the cost of fortiﬁcants. Tajik salt 
industries and ﬂour mills were exempted from cost 
sharing because they were still recovering from the 
aftermath of civil war. The cost-sharing subsidy was 
intended as a start-up measure only—fortiﬁcation 
had to become self-sustaining.
Thus, partnerships were made on paper from the 
beginning of the initiative. How did they translate 
into practice?
Engaging the private sector in the initiative’s 
activities was a vital element for success. Collaboration 
helped to establish good working relations and strong 
partnership with the salt industry and ﬂour millers 
in all the countries. Through this involvement, the 
producers learned about the effects of micronutrient 
deﬁciency and gradually developed a sense of 
ownership of the fortiﬁcation program, taking on an 
increasing share of production costs as the initiative 
progressed.
Salt producers and ﬂour millers also 
demonstrated their sense of ownership by forming 
associations. In Mongolia, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
and Tajikistan, salt producers associations formed 
through the initiative later ensured the sustainability 
of production of quality iodized salt. In 2007, 
Kazakhstan was elected to be the ﬁrst president 
of the board of the new Eurasian Branch of the 
International Association of the Operating Millers, 
which comprises the ﬂour millers from 35 countries 
in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
In Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Mongolia, food producers associations led the 
process of fortiﬁcation equipment installation, and 
later Kazakhstan and Mongolia ﬂour millers started 
buying premix and feeders using private funds. In 
all the countries, private industry contributed to 
advertising the advantages of fortiﬁed food and made 
it a part of their marketing strategy. In Kazakhstan, 
for instance, two ﬂour milling companies advertised 
the advantage of their ﬂour and pasta, referring 
to its micronutrient content. In Mongolia, the 
food producers associations used the annual trade 
fairs in 2005–2007 to exhibit iodized salt and 
fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour. In 2006, the Mongolian 
Consumers Association, in cooperation with the 
Grain Processors Association, conducted a special 
competition in quality fortiﬁed food. In addition, 
food producers helped in the design and adoption 
of many legislative documents and standards on 
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fortiﬁed food production and distribution. 
In all the participating countries, the salt 
associations identiﬁed problems in their industries 
and discussed solutions with governments and 
the donor community. The associations also gave 
technical assistance to the industry on improving 
the quality of iodized salt and strengthening internal 
laboratory control. Further, they took an active part 
in training salt technology engineers and laboratory 
technicians. In the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, 
these associations led the supply of potassium iodate 
to salt producers.
In summary, the industry gradually accepted 
ownership of the fortiﬁcation concept. If it had 
balked or refused to cooperate in the spirit of the 
initiative, the process would have taken much longer 
and there would have been many transgressions, 
while the public received conﬂicting messages from 
government and industry and lost enthusiasm about 
fortiﬁcation.
Public–private partnership included civil 
society. For example, nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) in Khatlon Province, Tajikistan, conducted 
a forum that discussed banning the production and 
sale of noniodized salt from the open salt deposits. 
The forum was supported by the government and 
international agencies, and was attended by senior 
government ofﬁcials, local authorities, community 
leaders, food producers, and NGOs. It led to a 
signiﬁcant increase in the use of iodized salt at local 
markets and in households.
Could Fortiﬁed Staple Foods Be Made 
Affordable for the Poor in Central Asian 
Countries and Mongolia? 
Many voluntarily fortiﬁed branded products are 
unaffordable by the poor. A good example is fortiﬁed 
ready-to-eat breakfast cereal, which has widespread 
appeal and many health beneﬁts. The poor usually 
spend their limited resources on basic, inexpensive 
food staples. Therefore, the initiative chose the most 
basic staples in the region—salt and wheat ﬂour—
for fortiﬁcation.
Consumers are very sensitive to price increases 
of staple foods and a slight price increase could 
impede the demand for fortiﬁed foods. Thus, 
it was very important to contain the cost of 
fortiﬁcation. Theoretically, the cost of potassium 
iodate to iodize salt and the premix for enriching 
ﬂour is negligible; in reality, food producers often 
increased food prices by more than just the cost 
of adding fortiﬁcants. In Mongolia, for example, 
retailers were selling iodized salt in 1997 (before the 
initiative) at $0.32–$0.50 per kilogram compared 
with $0.13–$0.35 per kilogram for common, 
noniodized salt. The cost of ﬂour fortiﬁcation was 
initially an unknown factor because it was a new 
concept for the region.
By the end of the initiative, the price increment 
throughout the region was minimal for iodized salt 
and negligible for fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour. This resulted 
from (i) the mandatory nature of fortiﬁcation across 
the region, which made a level playing ﬁeld; and 
(ii) demand creation, which was carried out in 
parallel with the initiative’s progress in production 
of fortiﬁed food and introduced economies of scale 
as production increased and demand rose.
In fortiﬁed ﬂour, premix cost to millers was less 
than $1 per ton of ﬂour. There were no observed price 
differences between fortiﬁed and nonfortiﬁed ﬂour 
in the market. The large difference in price between 
ﬁrst- and second-grade ﬂour, however, created a 
marketing obstacle. The initiative fortiﬁed ﬁrst-grade 
ﬂour, but most rural populations purchased second-
grade ﬂour. Second-grade ﬂour contains a substantial 
amount of nutrients because it is less reﬁned, but it 
is still deﬁcient in bio-available iron and folic acid. 
The initiative had little trouble convincing urban 
populations who already purchased ﬁrst-grade ﬂour 
to switch to fortiﬁed ﬂour, but found it difﬁcult to 
convince rural populations to shift from second-
grade ﬂour to fortiﬁed ﬁrst-grade ﬂour.
Would There be Added Value to the Target 
Countries through a Regional Approach to 
Food Fortiﬁcation? 
The value-added question challenged ADB’s 
method of operating in terms of leveraging 
support, coordination, and collaboration among 
its developing member countries. Two important 
aspects of the initiative came under scrutiny:
• Could regional developing-country standards in 
food fortiﬁcation, and the policy and regulatory 
environment to enforce them, be created and 
implemented? 
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• Could regionwide demand for fortiﬁcation to 
improve health be created? 
Creating and Enforcing  
Region-wide Standards
The initiative expected that a regional approach 
would enable establishment of common standards 
for fortiﬁed salt and ﬂour, achieve economies of 
scale, take advantage of cross-learning, and enrich 
interregional cooperation. ADB support on a 
country-by-country basis would not allow these 
advantages and be unable to address regional issues, 
such as trade and its regulation.
The earlier presence of a government and 
regulation system common to ﬁve of the countries, 
and their similar micronutrient problems (with 
Mongolia a close neighbor in economic links and 
dietary preferences with Central Asia), suggested 
that a regional approach to fortiﬁcation would 
be logical. However, fortiﬁcation standards for 
so large a region had not been attempted before, 
with the exception of Central America. All the 
participating countries had to agree on one set of 
standards and to set up appropriate regulations 
and laws. 
Agreement by all the countries to use the 
same fortiﬁcants for salt and ﬂour made design of 
common standards straightforward and was one of 
the most important contributions of the initiative. 
Most participating countries adopted mandatory 
legislation for iodized salt by 2004 (Uzbekistan 
adopted the universal salt iodization [USI] law in 
2007), which also prohibited the importation of 
non-iodized salt for human consumption. All the 
participating countries have now adopted USI and 
similar national standards to ensure adequate salt 
iodization—all because of the initiative’s continued 
advocacy. 
Much capacity development was needed for 
the initiative’s participating countries to become 
familiar with, and accept the need for, mandatory 
fortiﬁcation and the accompanying regulations. 
First, factory capacity to produce the fortiﬁed foods 
in many cases had to be improved. Second, industry 
personnel needed to learn the beneﬁts of fortiﬁcation 
and best fortiﬁcation practices, and to become 
familiar with existing or planned regulations to 
ensure full compliance. Third, government agencies, 
including regulatory authorities, needed help 
preparing appropriate legislation and regulations on 
fortiﬁcation for their country. 
Failure in one component of the capacity 
development would have meant failure of the 
program in one country and a decrease in the regional 
beneﬁts to the other countries. For example, the 
2004 ﬂour fortiﬁcation law in Kazakhstan, which 
did not have the support of the milling industry, 
was temporarily rescinded in 2007 (Box 2.2). 
This discouraged other countries from pursuing 
mandatory ﬂour fortiﬁcation. 
The ﬁnal success of the initiative’s regional 
approach to food fortiﬁcation would be 
harmonization of trade regulations that allowed only 
correctly fortiﬁed, prescribed foods to cross borders 
in the region. The choice of common fortiﬁcants 
and their addition in the same standard proportions 
in all the countries have virtually assured regional 
harmonization, although not all the legislation, 
particularly for ﬂour, is yet in place.
For countries that rely on imported ﬂour, such 
as the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, it 
is necessary to establish a regulatory framework, with 
incentives to import fortiﬁed ﬂour, if the countries 
are serious about increasing their populations’ access 
to fortiﬁed ﬂour. The progress to date, however, has 
vindicated the regional nature of the initiative.
Creating Region-wide Supply and Demand
Demand for iodized salt across the participating 
countries increased substantially during the 
initiative. By the end of the ﬁrst Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction (JFPR) project, 24 million 
new consumers of iodized salt were added in the 
population of Central Asia and Mongolia; household 
use of iodized salt reached 90% in Kazakhstan. 
Annual savings to the combined national economies 
from avoiding iodine deﬁciencies was estimated to 
be up to $300 million. Demand creation for fortiﬁed 
ﬂour was less universal, but where it was attempted, 
consumers responded and, as the sentinel studies 
showed, they beneﬁted signiﬁcantly.
Thus, the second question on the added value 
of the initiative’s regional approach—could region-
wide demand for fortiﬁcation to improve health be 
created and capacity to meet the demand be built?—
was answered positively through the initiative’s 
advocacy, creation of new alliances, capacity 
building, motivation of stakeholder groups, and 
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social marketing. It turned out that participating 
countries were already heavily interdependent for 
meeting the need for wheat grains, ﬂour, and salt. To 
keep fortiﬁcation issues visible to government and 
industry, most participating countries designed and 
promoted wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation laws, resulting to 
date in their approval by Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
The new alliances that formed between 
government policy makers, regulatory authorities, 
private food producers, private suppliers of fortiﬁcants 
and equipment, research and academic institutions, 
NGOs, and civil society were invaluable in creating 
a sense of ownership of fortiﬁcation, developing 
effective strategies, and creating a positive attitude 
to nutrition—and hence demand for it. These need 
to be institutionalized to ensure their long-term 
viability.
Capacity building for stakeholders across the 
countries resulted in a ﬁrm basis for sustainable, 
national fortiﬁcation capacity and regional 
cooperation to help meet regional demand.
The many communication tools aimed at 
consumers, from mass media to neighborhood 
volunteers, played a major part in creating demand. 
Uniformity of the fortiﬁcation messages helped 
achieve a region-wide positive attitude to fortiﬁed 
foods amongst the public. The healthy food logo was 
one such unifying tool—a product of stakeholder 
motivation that now appears on packages of fortiﬁed 
products in all the countries. For the industry, it is 
an incentive that stimulates demand for a healthier 
product. 
Lessons 
Numerous lessons were learned during the initiative, 
some of which are discussed or implied in the earlier 
sections. In general, the initiative’s achievements were 
made possible by the project design, which called 
for balanced attention to food production, quality 
assurance, structural reform, institutional capacity 
development, and communication for sustained 
demand. These wide-ranging tasks required careful 
preparation in each of the participating countries. 
The following summarizes what was learned.
Mandatory Fortiﬁcation Legislation
Political support at the highest level is needed to 
ensure sustainability of food fortiﬁcation programs. 
Voluntary fortiﬁcation does not lead to the mass 
availability of fortiﬁed staple foods. Mandatory food 
fortiﬁcation legislation, which creates a level playing 
ﬁeld for all producers, is necessary. 
Political Support 
Food fortiﬁcation to reduce public health problems 
must be supported by policy measures that provide 
incentives for fortifying foods and ensure the 
safety of the fortiﬁed foods. In addition, laws and 
regulations must be thoroughly implemented by 
the government control agencies. The initiative’s 
experience shows that food fortiﬁcation succeeds 
if (i) political will is demonstrated at the highest 
level, (ii) food and nutrition policy implementation 
is an integral part of national development policy, 
and (iii) a system for monitoring nutrition status 
and progress in food fortiﬁcation implementation 
regularly gives feedback to decision makers. 
Nutrition and health are relatively low priorities 
in the national budgets of developing countries. 
The health authorities often failed to provide top 
decision-making bodies with convincing data on 
the magnitude of micronutrient malnutrition and 
its economic and health costs, compared to the 
advantages and low cost of fortiﬁed food. Frequent 
changes of ministers and other decision makers also 
sometimes eroded the support built up by country 
project teams, and this could not be reestablished 
before the initiative ended.
Public–Private Partnership
Public–private partnership was essential in 
sustaining the initiative’s momentum. Project 
steering committees, which later became national 
food fortiﬁcation alliances, provided a framework 
for new, multisector collaboration encompassing the 
public, private, academic, donor, and NGOs devoted 
to food fortiﬁcation. Alliance membership should 
be deﬁned by shared objectives, an understanding 
of how mutual contributions beneﬁt the whole 
alliance, mutual cooperation, and respect for other 
organizations in the alliance. In many cases, the 
challenge of alliance building lies in working with 
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the most senior ofﬁcials in the allied groups. Only 
when they can be persuaded to act beyond their 
own organization’s role and provide support for 
the alliance and its other members can they achieve 
major goals, such as prevention and control of iodine 
deﬁciency and anemia. In the ﬁrst JFPR project, all 
groups accepted that no agency or project could 
tackle these problems alone.
Incentives for Food Producers
The initiative found that, even with mandatory 
fortiﬁcation legislation, incentives for private 
producers to start fortiﬁcation were helpful and 
often necessary. Lack of incentives for food producers 
resulted in low production, because expenditures 
were not balanced with sales.
Incentives employed in the participating 
countries included tax exemptions; import licenses 
and loans for equipment and raw materials; initial 
subsidies to buy fortiﬁcants; assistance in developing 
quality control systems and training production, 
administrative, and marketing personnel; training 
the wholesale and retail sectors; and prohibiting 
imports. 
The extent of incentives required for convincing 
private producers to fortify foods depends on their 
attitudes and expectation for government support. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, millers 
complained that food fortiﬁcation interventions 
were not proﬁtable. However, in Kazakhstan and 
Mongolia, the ﬂour millers considered fortiﬁcation 
as a tool for marketing and promoting quality 
products.
Demand Creation through Social Marketing
In future communication activities, demand 
creation can beneﬁt from signiﬁcant adjustments. 
For example, during the initiative, complementary 
communication activities by different groups were 
uncommon, and this substantially reduced their 
impact. Better-coordinated, mutually reinforcing 
messages sharing both a common theme and 
common styles across media would be more effective. 
Critical analysis of each country’s communication 
work should precede design of new strategies.
At the consumer level, future communication 
activities need to improve and carefully monitor 
and manage the links between supply of iodized 
salt and fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour and activities related 
to generating demand. The more that can be done 
to involve millers and salt producers who are in 
leadership positions in alliances and communication 
activities, the better future projects are likely to fare.
Financial Sustainability
Cost sharing is an important ﬁrst step toward 
sustainability. The main difference between 
the initiative and other donor support for food 
fortiﬁcation was how the necessary inputs were 
ﬁnanced.
Earlier, salt iodization was supported by other 
donors, who supplied free equipment and potassium 
iodate to salt producers. Consequently, salt producers 
and governments became dependent on donors, 
which appeared to be one of the reasons why USI 
did not happen after years of donor support.
The initiative made it clear that countries had to 
sustain fortiﬁcation on their own by the end of the 
project. Thus, the initiative and producers shared 
the cost of fortiﬁcants from the beginning. Food 
producers did not mind sharing the cost as long as 
there was a level playing ﬁeld, which could only be 
done through mandatory fortiﬁcation.
Once legislation and regulatory frameworks 
for mandatory fortiﬁcation and quality assurance 
and control (QAC) are in place, and demand for 
fortiﬁed foods has been created, the ﬁnancial 
capacity of the particular food producer determines 
the sustainability of food fortiﬁcation. 
The initiative found that many producers, 
especially in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, had 
little ﬁnancial capacity to purchase fortiﬁcants in 
bulk. They could purchase only a small amount at a 
time, or pay for the fortiﬁcants only after selling the 
products. In Uzbekistan, producers had problems 
with foreign currency exchange and limited licensing 
for premix importation.
In such cases, food producers’ associations play 
a crucial role in pooling members’ resources and can 
carry out procurement for all members to achieve 
economies of scale. Tajikistan came up with a creative 
solution: its food producers’ association created a 
revolving fund to purchase potassium iodate. The 
revolving fund is still operational.
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Quality Control
Quality control in Central Asia needs further 
improvement at industrial sites and in monitoring 
food products at the retail level. Only Kazakhstan 
has an adequate system of industrial quality control 
for salt; the other countries need to improve the 
basic quality control procedures. The quality 
of iodized salt in Mongolia and Uzbekistan, for 
example, needed special attention in view of 
impurities and dampness of the raw salt. In ﬂour 
milling, Kazakhstan and Mongolia have developed 
appropriate quality control systems (mostly at large 
ﬂour mills), while the other countries still need to 
strengthen the internal laboratories of the mills. 
As for external control, the initiative largely 
relied on the ofﬁcial sanitary epidemiological 
services (SESs) for inspection. Some people felt that 
their punitive approach was not always helpful and 
suggested that the initiative should have reformed 
SESs or established a different system, especially 
when rent-seeking behavior by SESs was suspected. 
Although institutional reforms of SESs would 
have been helpful, focusing on reform would have 
diverted project time and resources with little effect. 
Even if weaknesses of SESs had been better known 
to those who designed the project, they still would 
have decided to work with the existing quality 
assurance system rather than create a new one. 
Need for Information on Food Producers
Limited information hampered the initiative from 
the outset. In all aspects, there was little available data 
compared with the situation in other parts of Asia. 
Almost no lessons from previous experience could 
be found to draw on. Lack of information especially 
affected ﬂour fortiﬁcation. Absence of information 
on the production and ﬁnancial capacity of ﬂour 
producers caused problems and delays in choosing 
mills to participate in the initiative, and absence of 
information on kinds of ﬂour—the premium, ﬁrst, or 
second grade consumed by different populations—
led to focus on ﬁrst-grade ﬂour fortiﬁcation, while 
rural populations largely consumed second-grade 
ﬂour. The projects were frequently adjusted as new 
information became available, and they overcame 
most of the problems. The initiative ﬁlled critical 
information gaps in food fortiﬁcation knowledge 
in the participating countries that will be vital for 
future fortiﬁcation activities in the region. Still, any 
new attempt to fortify food should be preceded by 
situation analysis of the particular food industry in 
addition to studying the feasibility of fortiﬁcation 
itself.
Technology Transfer
Technology transfer accelerates establishment of 
food fortiﬁcation better than substituting local 
capacity with foreign capacity. The initiative 
decided not to engage international consultants 
extensively, but to engage them selectively to build 
local capacity. Technical assistance was also included 
in the procurement contract. This domestic capacity 
development helped the countries to carry out 
food fortiﬁcation without external help. Also, food 
producers, especially millers in Central Asia and 
Mongolia, are capable and ﬁnd innovative solutions 
to various problems during ﬂour fortiﬁcation. 
Technical lessons learned during the initiative have 
been incorporated into training manuals, such as 
the Flour Fortiﬁcation Initiative’s Millers’ Toolkit. 
A Mongolian-language training manual was also 
written. Some of the material has been translated 
into Russian—there were few Russian technical 
materials available at the start of the initiative, which 
was a complaint voiced by some millers. 
Risks of External Shocks
The risk of external shocks needs to be factored into 
any food fortiﬁcation project. For example, wheat 
ﬂour production varies depending on weather, 
so price and availability ﬂuctuate greatly. This 
negatively affected ﬂour fortiﬁcation during project 
implementation. Smaller countries that depend 
on imports for their wheat did not have enough 
wheat ﬂour in 2003 to fortify, prices rose, and both 
governments and industries temporarily stopped 
promoting ﬂour fortiﬁcation because of its (albeit 
marginal) additional cost.
Conclusion
As the UNICEF representative said at the initiative’s 
ﬁnal conference, the initiative has put “micronutrient 
deﬁciencies” on nonnutritionists’ agendas and 
brought investment by other international 
organizations in Central Asia. This hastened the 
transfer of appropriate fortiﬁcation technologies 
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to the food industry, helped governments put 
regulatory frameworks in place, built awareness of 
the beneﬁts of fortiﬁed salt and ﬂour among the 
region’s population, and developed the ability of 
NGOs and consumer groups to monitor the quality 
of foods. The initiative has also generated other 
external assistance to develop capacity in nutrition 
and food fortiﬁcation in the region. 
All these achievements crystallized together 
and demonstrated that iodine deﬁciency disorders 
(IDD) have been reduced, and the potential exists 
for major reduction of iron deﬁciency anemia 
(IDA) through ﬂour fortiﬁcation. As discussed 
earlier, decreased incidence of IDD and IDA will 
lead to fewer maternal and infant deaths and mental 
retardation cases, and lead to economic gains in 
national economies. 
The initiative demonstrated a relatively 
inexpensive and sustainable approach to attaining 
some of the Millennium Development Goals 
(particularly those in health and education) by 
working toward nationwide protection against 
micronutrient deﬁciencies that would otherwise 
cause major public health problems and reduced 
outcomes of education. 
However, mass fortiﬁcation of food staples is 
not a panacea; it takes years and great effort to get 
started, accepted, and established to the point of 
being self-sustaining. Fortiﬁcation of staple foods 
also does not directly beneﬁt, nor is it aimed at, 
children under 2 years of age. 
Mass fortiﬁcation cannot meet the needs of 
population segments with special nutritional needs, 
such as young infants, pregnant and lactating 
women, the sick and inﬁrm, or the elderly. Central 
Asia contains remote regions without ready access to 
commercially milled ﬂour, particularly in winter when 
road travel is impossible. For these cases, alternative 
or additional interventions will remain preferable, 
including supplements and complementary weaning 
foods for infants and children under 2 years of age. 
Regardless of the initial success of fortiﬁcation 
efforts, the underlying deﬁciency in the soil (salt) 
and processed product (wheat ﬂour) remain constant 
threats to nutrition. The disorders and diseases that 
compel fortiﬁcation can return under a variety of 
circumstances. Fortiﬁcation must be continued into 
perpetuity, all other things being equal. This requires 
continued political will, institutionalization of the 
fortiﬁcation paradigm, and adequate budget for its 
implementation. In turbulent social or economic 
times, none of these can be guaranteed.
Next Steps
Much remains to be done. The foremost needs are 
to consolidate and continue or accelerate the rate 
of progress already made toward individual and 
harmonized standards, legislation, and regulations, 
bearing in mind that there are limits to how much 
the different countries in a regional initiative will 
cooperate.23 
Nevertheless, the existence of a single mandatory 
standard means that trade issues—at least among the 
participating countries—will not remain a barrier to 
universal fortiﬁcation in the region. 
The third Almaty Forum, near the end of the 
initiative (October 2007), adopted recommendations 
for follow-up actions and helped design and adopt 
the national action plans for 2008–2010 by all 
participating countries. These countries committed 
to a number of individual actions—mainstreaming 
food fortiﬁcation strategies into national development 
plans, strengthening national fortiﬁcation alliances, 
completing necessary legislation and regulations, 
monitoring imports and quality and safety, 
removing barriers to procurement of fortiﬁcants and 
equipment, and setting aside a sufﬁcient budget for 
these purposes.
At the regional level, the countries agreed 
to strengthen their collaboration on aspects of 
fortiﬁcation and to harmonize standards, remove 
impediments to trade in fortiﬁed foods, and create 
further economies of scale for food fortiﬁcation 
inputs. The Declaration of the Third Almaty Forum, 
which includes the recommendations, is shown in 
Appendix 6.
23 For example, the countries have agreed on a single ﬂour fortiﬁcation premix and fortiﬁed standard but not on a set of mandatory 
regulations or food control measures. Each country in the initiative has written its own regulations with little attempt to harmonize 
them.
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Near the end of the projects, there was a movement 
toward establishing a regional ﬂour milling association 
that led to the formation of the Central Asian 
International Association of Operative Mills. This was 
a type of result the initiative wished for—a regional 
association independent of external assistance. 
Since the projects ﬁnished at the end of 2007, 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have adopted 
mandatory ﬂour fortiﬁcation laws. Uzbekistan is said 
to have drafted one also. Salt iodization has largely 
been maintained, at least at the level the countries 
achieved by the end of 2007. The Kyrgyz Republic 
has received donor assistance in purchasing premix, 
although it has a different composition from KAP 1. 
The impact of the Kyrgyz Republic using a different 
premix from the rest of the region is unknown.
The initiative has proven that a regional 
approach can be effective. Other donor agencies 
continue to support food fortiﬁcation in the region, 
but in each country, not on a regional scale.
Inclusive growth and regional integration are 
two of the three strategic agendas of ADB’s long-term 
strategic framework for 2008–2020, Strategy 2020,24 
which emphasizes the private sector as a driving 
force for inclusive growth. Ten years have passed 
since the pivotal Manila Forum 2000, Strategies 
to Fortify Essential Foods in Asia and the Paciﬁc. 
During the decade since 2000, Asia and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), together with other 
development agencies, have acquired experience in 
promoting food fortiﬁcation. With the new focus of 
Strategy 2020, ADB should reinvigorate its efforts 
to promote food fortiﬁcation through public–
private partnership so as to deliver much-needed 
micronutrients to populations in need. 
24 ADB. 2008. Strategy 2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008–2020. Manila.
APPENDIX 1
History of Food Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia  
and Mongolia before the Initiative
Iodine
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 1991
In the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), the addition of potassium iodide to salt to 
address iodine deﬁciency was, for almost 40 years, 
governed by a 1954 ordinance from the Ministry of 
Health in Moscow that deﬁned the regions in the 
USSR with a high prevalence of endemic goiter, to 
which iodized salt should be supplied. This ordinance 
formed the legal basis for the establishment of anti-
goiter dispensaries uniﬁed under the central Anti-
Goiter Commission in Moscow and anti-goiter 
committees in each of the listed regions under their 
respective republican ministries of health. 
Large-scale enterprises for salt production were 
set up ﬁrst in Russia and Ukraine and, from the 
mid-1950s, also in Kazakhstan and other republics. 
The Salt Industry Research and Development 
Institute in Ukraine devised machineries for salt 
harvesting, washing, and processing that were used 
throughout the republics. The potassium iodide 
used for iodization at that time was readily available 
from underground sources in Azerbaijan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Data from a personal 
archive kept by the president of the Association of 
Russian Salt Producers indicate that the total supply 
of iodized salt in the USSR increased from about 
100,000 tons to almost 1 million tons between 
1950 and 1965. 
The 1954 ordinance also mandated state-
ﬁnanced distribution of iodine tablets to pregnant 
and breast-feeding women, young children, and 
adolescents in high-risk areas. By 1965, a USSR-wide 
survey found the total goiter prevalence to be 6.2%, 
indicating a successful campaign. Prevalence fell 
further by 1969, to 5.0%, attributed to tightening 
of measures aimed at control and prevention.
By the early 1970s, goiter had been virtually 
eliminated and new cases of endemic cretinism 
were no longer observed. The Ministry of Health in 
Moscow ofﬁcially declared that endemic goiter had 
been overcome and it abandoned central oversight 
and monitoring.
By the mid-1980s, however, sanitary 
epidemiological services (SESs) in the republics 
increasingly reported ﬁndings of low-quality 
iodized salt resulting from aging equipment and 
the instability of potassium iodide fortiﬁcant. In 
1986, signiﬁcant proportions of samples from the 
Soviet republics were reported to contain no iodine. 
Around the same time, iodized salt production 
started to decrease, along with the overall decline 
in the centralized Soviet economy. In 1990, the 
production of iodized salt was only about half the 
planned amount of 1.4 million tons.
The USSR Ministry of Health during 1986–
1989 widened the orientation of dispensaries from 
the treatment and control of endemic goiter to 
diagnosis and treatment of endocrine conditions, 
primarily diabetes, although no extra resources were 
provided to meet these goals. A 1990 survey in 11 
of the 15 republics recorded 1,044,767 people with 
goiter—a marked rise over the 1969 ﬁgure. In some 
Soviet republics, the recorded number of patients 
had increased by 24%–177% between 1969 and 
1988–1990. By 1990, it was obvious that iodine 
deﬁciency disorders (IDD) had reemerged as a 
signiﬁcant public health threat in the Soviet Union.
Central Asia from 1991
In Central Asia, salt supplies were falling in response 
to the economic difﬁculties associated with transition 
from a centralized economy, the privatization of 
salt and other food enterprises, and the absence 
of regulatory acts and economic incentives for 
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production. In Kazakhstan, in 1993, less than 25% 
of the local salt production was reported as iodized. 
Goiter prevalence among schoolchildren in Kentau 
town in South Kazakhstan oblast (district) reached 
26% (1,025 people examined) by 1997, while 
among adults a goiter rate as high as 50%–60% was 
cited. According to reports from obstetric facilities 
in Almaty, hypothyroidism was diagnosed in 7.2% 
of newborns in 1996, which was 150–300 times 
higher than records of iodine-sufﬁcient countries. 
The need for a national policy on nutrition, 
including elimination of IDD, was raised in 
Kazakhstan for the ﬁrst time in 1996 at an 
international conference held in Almaty with 
the support of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID). Follow-
up action to start (re)building national capacity to 
address iodine deﬁciency through salt iodization 
took place with assistance of the Central Asia Area 
UNICEF Ofﬁce in 1997. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, surveys in 1991 showed 
goiter prevalence of 25%–28% among adults in 
Bishkek, Chui, and Issyk-Kul oblasts; and thyroid 
diseases reported by the health facilities were rapidly 
increasing from 1992 onward, most likely due to 
increased goiter diagnoses. In September 1994, the 
prime minister signed a decree on the elimination 
of IDD in the population of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
stipulating that all food-grade salt for human and 
animal consumption should be iodized according 
to the interstate industry standard (gosudarstvennyy 
standart, or GOST) that had previously been in 
force in the USSR. However, the government intent 
to develop a national program, including legislation 
and enforcement of salt iodization, came to fruition 
only after the 1990s. 
Historically, Tajikistan was known for the severe 
IDD prevalence in its population. Up into the 1970s, 
the IDD extent was reported to have been reduced to 
mild. An assessment in April 1994, however, showed 
that goiter in school-aged children was as high as 
42% in Dushanbe and 86% in Tursun-Zade, an area 
selected by local endocrinologists for its historically 
high IDD burden. In May 1997, the government 
issued an approval ordinance of a national program 
for IDD control giving priority to salt iodization, 
along with detection, registration, and treatment 
of goiter cases. UNICEF provided equipment and 
fortiﬁcant for some years.
Until 1991, all the salt for human consumption 
in Uzbekistan was imported from Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, reportedly duly iodized according to 
regulations. Following independence, the Uzbekistan 
government fostered local salt production, and 
by 1993, it was reported that about one-third 
of the edible salt consumed in the country was 
produced locally but not iodized. Between 1997 
and 1999, UNICEF donated spray iodization units 
and fortiﬁcant to various producers in an effort 
to increase iodized salt supplies. UNICEF also 
offered support for the development of a national 
IDD control program. However, despite goiter 
prevalence in 1997–1998 of more than 40%, the 
government was not then interested. A multiple 
indicator cluster survey (MICS) in 2000, the ﬁrst 
nationally representative survey of iodized salt use 
in Uzbekistan, showed that only 19% of households 
were using adequately iodized salt.
In Central Asia by the end of 1999, UNICEF had 
donated a sizable amount of iodization equipment 
and potassium iodate, sufﬁcient in theory to enable 
iodization of a major part of the national edible 
salt supplies. The disappointingly low outcomes 
observed in the use of iodized salt in households 
indicated that more was needed than just provision 
of technology and fortiﬁcant inputs.
The oversight and direction characteristic of 
the centrally planned goiter-control efforts during 
the 1950s and 1960s had completely disappeared. 
As well, although the inputs were necessary, they 
were not sufﬁcient to persuade the salt producers to 
supply good-quality iodized salt. The salt producers 
did not see the resolution of a health issue as a core 
value. The purchase orders from their customers 
did not specify that the salt should be iodized, 
obligatory certiﬁcation by the state of standards had 
not yet been ﬁrmly introduced, and the threat of 
penalties associated with food inspections was low. 
Thus, universal salt iodization (USI) could not be 
reached, and IDD could not be overcome through 
stimulation of only a single sector. 
Mongolia from 1990
The population of Mongolia in the 1950s was 
mostly nomadic, although urbanization had started 
to increase. Mongolia’s landscape offers many natural 
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salt deposits that have been used for centuries for 
human and animal consumption, as well as other 
common uses, such as preparing leather and 
preserving meat. 
Discussions of IDD and their elimination started 
during the early 1990s in response to the World 
Summit for Children. In 1993, the overall prevalence 
of goiter among children was 29.2%. The minister 
of health proposed that all salt intended for humans 
and animals should be iodized, a measure resisted by 
some inﬂuential scientists who were not convinced 
that the survey results signiﬁed iodine deﬁciency. 
However, a national plan of action was developed 
and ofﬁcially inaugurated by the president in 1996. 
UNICEF and the Government of Japan provided 
supplies and equipment for implementing the plan. 
But the legislation and/or regulation necessary 
for safeguarding the agreed USI strategy did not 
follow. Thus, notwithstanding the huge assistance 
that followed the launch of a national program in 
1996, only little more than half the households in 
Mongolia were using adequately iodized salt by the 
turn of the century.
Iodine Status, End 1990s 
The collective experience in Central Asia and 
Mongolia showed that a different approach was 
needed to advance iodization in the region. The 
method should combine the abilities of the public, 
private, and civic sectors and be based on mutually 
supportive actions by concerned people who could 
marshal and prioritize the requisite knowledge, talents, 
and resources. The contributions by each sector and 
specialty should be guided and overseen by a national 
partnership involving all the key sectors.
In May 2001, the presidents of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan were among the heads of state who 
supported acceptance of an agreement to prevent 
iodine deﬁciency among the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, signed in Minsk, Belarus. The 
agreement stressed coordination and harmonization 
of efforts and offered an important starting point 
for Central Asian countries to agree to a common 
framework for the legislation and execution of salt 
iodization policies.
Globally, more than 70% of households were 
using iodized salt by the end of 1999, compared 
with less than 20% in 1990. USI progress was 
seen to vary from close to 90% in Latin America 
to 22% in Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, and the Baltic States. Regional 
progress, therefore, did not differ signiﬁcantly from 
that in the countries of concern here. 
Table A1.1, based on a World Health 
Organization (WHO) report,25 summarizes 
program status in the countries, supplemented with 
data from the various information sources used in 
the present historical perspective. These data serve 
as a summary benchmark for the countries at the 
beginning of the initiative. 
Iron
Wheat is the obvious vehicle for iron fortiﬁcation 
in Central Asia. It originated as a cultivated crop 
around 6,000–8,000 years ago in the region of Asia 
that now runs from Iraq to Turkmenistan. Wheat 
cultivation and the popularity of bread spread 
throughout the Middle East into Egypt, Europe, 
Central Asia, and northern parts of what is now 
the People’s Republic of China. Wheat is still a 
vital food staple in these areas. Per capita wheat 
ﬂour consumption in Central Asian countries 
(Table A1.2) is among the highest in the world. 
Wheat supplies more calories and more protein to 
the population than any other crop.
USSR to 1991
The USSR ran a limited wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
program from roughly the 1970s into the 1980s 
but it did not include iron. The program involved 
adding thiamin, riboﬂavin, and niacin at very 
large ﬂour mills in the Soviet Union with milling 
capacities of over 500 tons annually. This included 
some mills in the Central Asian republics. The 
vitamins were supplied by Moscow to the mills. 
The mills stopped fortifying as vitamin supplies 
dwindled and the equipment fell into disrepair. By 
1990, ﬂour fortiﬁcation in the Soviet Union had 
ceased. 
25 B. de Benoist, et al., eds. 2004. Iodine Status Worldwide. WHO Global Database on Iodine Deﬁciency. Geneva: WHO.
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Table A1.1: Summary of National Iodine and Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders Elimination Policy  
and Program Status, 2000
Indicator Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz  
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Population (millions) 14.9 4.9 2.5 6.4 24.8
Gross Domestic Prod-
uct ($/capita) 5,000 2,700 1,780 1,140 2,400
Iodine Deﬁciency 
Extent. Most recent 
survey, goiter preva-
lence, urinary iodine, 
TSH, cretinism
Moderate to 
severe ID, 
survey in 1999 
showed median 
UIE 95 μg/l 
among women 
of child-bearing 
age. Cretinism 
known histori-
cally.
Moderate to 
severe ID, 
small studies 
of school-aged 
children 1994 
showed 39% 
goiter, median 
UIE 30 μg/l. 
TSH elevated 
in 60% of 
newborns in 
major mater-
nity clinics.
Mild to 
moderate ID, 
national survey 
of school-aged 
children 1993: 
29% goiter. All 
but 2 aimags 
(provinces) af-
fected, ID most 
severe in central 
and west 
Mongolia and 
Ulaanbaatar.
Moderate to 
severe ID. 
Cretinism in 
GBAO known 
historically. 
Small studies 
of school-
aged children 
1994: goiter 
42%–86% in 
Dushanbe and 
Tursun-Zade.
Moderate to 
severe ID, 
nonrepresenta-
tive large-scale 
surveys in 1997 
show goiter 
increase in 
school-aged 
children to 
>40%. 
Salt Industry. Num-
ber of salt producers, 
amount of edible salt 
produced, imported 
and exported, packag-
ing
Salt locally pro-
duced, mainly 
by AralTuz 
(80% of nation-
al supply) and 
PavlodarSol. 
Imports in west 
and northeast 
Kazakhstan  
from the former 
Soviet Union.
More than 75% 
salt imported 
from Kazakhstan 
(AralTuz and 
Zhambyl). 3 
local processors, 
poor packaging, 
no labeling.
Majority of 
salt imported 
from Russia 
or the People’s 
Republic of 
China. Local 
consumption 
from many 
natural de-
posits. Simple 
methods, poor-
quality salt.
Three major 
producers in 
Tajikistan. 
Exports to  
Kyrgyz Republic, 
Afghanistan, 
and Uzbekistan. 
Poor-quality 
salt, poor pack-
aging.
Major salt 
deposits 
developed to 
production un-
der government 
administration, 
packagers in 
Tashkent. Poor 
packaging, no 
labeling.
Salt Iodization. 
% adequately iodized 
household salt, level 
mandated, iodine com-
pound, cost of iodized 
salt
Iodization with 
iodate has been 
introduced at 
both AralTuz 
and Pavlodar. 
Industry qual-
ity and food 
control prac-
tices not yet 
settled. Health 
survey in 1999 
showed 29% 
households us-
ing adequately 
iodized salt.
Interstate 
USSR standard 
iodate has been 
introduced. Lo-
cal processors 
are equipped. 
QA, food 
control, and 
enforcement 
practices are 
weak. Health 
survey 1997 
showed 27% 
households us-
ing adequately 
iodized salt.
Voluntary 
iodization level 
introduced. 
Border control 
not functional. 
Use of salt from 
natural deposits 
highest in west 
Mongolia. 
Survey in 1998 
showed 78% 
households us-
ing adequately 
iodized salt. 
Iodized salt 
about twice as 
expensive as 
noniodized salt.
Interstate 
USSR standard 
iodate has been 
introduced. 
Industry qual-
ity and food 
control prac-
tices not yet 
settled. Iodized 
salt supplies 
reportedly up 
to 80% of total 
production. 
MICS 2000 
showed 20% 
households us-
ing adequately 
iodized salt.
No mandatory 
level stated by 
government. 
Local producers 
and processors 
equipped but 
industry quality 
and food con-
trol practices 
are unclear. 
Iodate has been 
introduced. 
MICS 2000 
showed 19% 
households us-
ing adequately 
iodized salt.
continued on next page
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Table A1.1 continued
Indicator Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz  
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Legislation and Regula-
tion. Principle act, 
subsidiary norms and 
regulations
Legislation 
pending. In 
practice, in-
terstate USSR 
standards still 
being followed.
1994 decree 
mandates 
iodization of all 
edible salt. Par-
liamentary law 
being prepared.
Legislation 
pending.
Legislation 
pending.
Government 
commitment 
weak. No effort 
to prepare for 
legislation yet.
National Coalition. Es-
tablishment, composi-
tion, meeting frequency
No effort 
yet made to 
promote a 
coalition.
No effort 
yet made to 
promote a 
coalition.
National 
Council for 
IDD Control, 
multisector, 
chaired by 
deputy minister 
of health.
No effort 
yet made to 
promote a 
coalition.
No government 
experience of 
partnership 
building. No 
effort yet made 
to promote a 
coalition.
National Program. 
Acceptance, major 
components, ﬁnancing, 
budget support
National 
program being 
prepared, main 
strategy USI 
but also supple-
ments being 
considered.
National pro-
gram not yet 
being consid-
ered.
National pro-
gram launched 
in 1996, main 
strategy USI. 
Local budget 
with UNICEF 
and JICA sup-
port.
National pro-
gram not yet 
being consid-
ered.
National pro-
gram not yet 
being consid-
ered.
Progress Monitoring. 
Arrangement, labora-
tory capacity, reporting
Dependence on 
large national 
surveys. Kazakh 
Academy of 
Nutrition well 
qualiﬁed.
No national 
surveys, but 
donor-driven 
small-scale 
studies in proj-
ect areas.
National survey 
completed in 
1999. Results 
pending.
Dependence 
on large na-
tional surveys. 
Endocrinology 
Dispensary is 
qualiﬁed.
Institute of 
Endocrinology 
plays central 
role but relies 
on small-scale 
studies.
Human Resources. 
Institutions, training 
needs, international 
links
Government 
ofﬁcials and 
industry staff 
generally well 
qualiﬁed
Need for train-
ing in indus-
try QA, lab 
capacity weak. 
Food inspec-
tion training 
needed.
Strong role by 
Public Health 
Institute. Links 
with Japanese 
and Chinese 
scientists.
Government 
ofﬁcials and 
industry staff 
weak and need 
training.
Government 
ofﬁcials and 
industry staff 
weak and need 
training.
Donor Involvement UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF, JICA UNICEF,  
Aga Khan
UNICEF
GBAO = Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, ID = iodine deﬁciency, IDD = iodine deﬁciency disorders, JICA = Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, MICS = multiple indicator cluster survey, QA = quality assurance, TSH = thyroid stimulating hormone, UIE = urinary 
iodine excretion, UNICEF = United Nations Children’s Fund, USI = universal salt iodization, USSR = former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, μg/l = micrograms per liter.
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Universal Salt Iodization in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. Experiences of Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. Manila.
Central Asia from 1991 
Prior to its fortiﬁcation efforts, UNICEF began an 
anemia prevention and control (APC) program in 
1997 in Central Asian countries. The program was 
based on education and provision of supplements of 
iron tablets alone, or iron tablets with folate tablets. 
At the same time, advocacy efforts were directed to 
increase acceptance of ﬂour fortiﬁcation.
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Table A1.2: Wheat Production and Flour Consumption in Central Asia  
and Mongolia
Flour Consumptionb
Country
2006  
Population
(millions)
Wheat
Production
(’000 tons/year)
Wheat Consumed 
Supplied by Local 
Wheat Production
(%)
(grams/ 
person/ 
day) (’000 tons/year)
Azerbaijan 8.5 1,537 89 428 1,299 
Kazakhstan 14.8 10,703 494 294 1,623 
Kyrgyz Republic 5.3 987 94a 417 785 
Mongolia 2.7 123 47 212 198 
Tajikistan 6.6 640 72 302 626 
Uzbekistan 27.0 4,186 144 304 2,912 
Total 64.9 18,175 ... ... 7,442 
Note: Wheat production ﬁgures are average Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) values for 2003–2005.
a This ﬁgure for the Kyrgyz Republic was reported to be 64% in 2008.
b  Flour consumption includes imports and is estimated from FAO wheat consumption values for 2003–2005 using a ﬂour extraction rate  
of 75%. 
Source: ADB. 2009. Promoting Wheat Flour Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia, 2001–2007. Experiences of Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction (JFPR) JFPR9005 and JFPR9052. Consultant’s report. Manila.
UNICEF initiated two ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
projects in Central Asia—one in the Kyrgyz 
Republic in 1995 and one in Turkmenistan in 
2000. Both involved fortifying ﬂour with iron 
from ferrous sulfate. The Kyrgyz Republic project 
also included adding a small amount of iodine to 
ﬂour as potassium iodate, which was used as a bread 
improver in the United States but also functions as a 
nutritional source of iodine. UNICEF supplied the 
ferrous sulfate and the microfeeders for adding it at 
the ﬂour mills.
This project faltered in the Kyrgyz Republic 
when some of the fortiﬁed ﬂour was found to turn 
rancid and change color. This is a well-known 
problem with the use of ferrous sulfate, occurring 
when an excessively high level is added or the ﬂour 
is stored for too long. Ferrous sulfate is considered 
a good source of nutritional iron because it is well 
absorbed by the body. It is also relatively inexpensive. 
Ferrous sulfate has been used to fortify bakery ﬂour 
in the United States for decades, but such ﬂour is 
normally used up within weeks of being milled. 
Wheat ﬂour contains a small amount of fat that 
can oxidize and turn rancid over time, giving it a 
limited shelf life. This problem is more pronounced 
with high storage temperatures and in higher-
extraction (high ash) ﬂours because they have a 
higher fat content. Ferrous sulfate is a pro-oxidant 
that accelerates the rate at which oxidative rancidity 
develops in ﬂour. The more ferrous sulfate added, 
the higher the ﬂour’s fat content, and the longer the 
ﬂour is stored all work to reduce a ﬂour’s shelf life by 
producing unacceptable odor and color.
It is probable that in the Kyrgyz Republic 
some of the ﬁrst-grade ﬂour (which has a higher fat 
content than the lower-ash, premium-grade ﬂour) 
was fortiﬁed with a much higher-than-desired level 
of ferrous sulfate, and this led to the reported quality 
problems. The experience gave ferrous sulfate, and 
to some extent ﬂour fortiﬁcation in general, a 
bad reputation in the country, so the project was 
terminated.
Turkmenistan appears to have avoided similar 
problems, because the level of ferrous sulfate being 
added there is very low—only 25 grams per ton of 
ﬂour or 8 parts per million (ppm) of added iron. 
The normal addition would be 94 grams of ferrous 
sulfate per ton, or 30 ppm of added iron. Any 
problems due to accidental overtreatment have not 
been serious or extensive enough to cause changes 
in the program. Another difference could be that 
the government-controlled milling industry does 
not depend on customer satisfaction as the private 
milling industry in the Kyrgyz Republic does. 
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Turkmenistan continues to fortify ﬂour with ferrous 
sulfate to this day, and increased the level to 25 ppm 
of iron in 2006.
Iron Status, End 1990s
UNICEF’s APC program continued to rely 
on education and supplement distribution. 
Educational efforts included promotion and 
instructions to pregnant women and small children 
on the regular use of iron tablets, or iron tablets 
with folate tablets, combined with recommending 
foods that are good sources of iron and encouraging 
tea drinking no closer than 30 minutes before or 
after eating. The APC program found that, while 
the supply and distribution of iron supplements was 
generally adequate, it fell short of preventing iron 
deﬁciency anemia (IDA) because of a continued 
focus on anemia treatment alone. Also, getting 
young children and nonpregnant women to take 
supplements regularly was difﬁcult and depended 
on how well the local health workers encouraged it. 
This was especially a problem with folic acid, which 
is needed prior to pregnancy if birth defects are to 
be prevented.
Many of these supplementation and educational 
activities are ongoing in the region, and they should 
always be part of any nutritional intervention 
program. But it is well recognized that human 
habits change slowly, so education alone has limited 
effectiveness, while distributing free supplements 
requires continuous funding by donor agencies or 
the government. 
APPENDIX 2
Almaty Declaration, 2001
Improving Nutrition of Poor Women 
and Children in Central Asia and 
Neighboring Countries 
After four days of deliberation, participants from six 
neighboring central Asia nations, attending a regional 
roundtable on salt and wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation from 
8-12 October sponsored by the Asian Development 
Bank, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the 
Kazakh Academy of Nutrition and funded by the 
Government of Japan through the Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction, agreed on the following set of 
principles, strategies and actions (to be supported by 
the Japan Fund through 2002):
• We recognize: 
In recent years the nutrition status of 
women and children in our region 
has deteriorated badly with negative 
consequences for children, families and 
nations - iodine and iron deﬁciencies 
are the most serious, but other essential 
nutrients need to be addressed; 
that the damage to the learning capacity 
of our children from iodine deﬁciency in 
pregnancy is irreversible;
that iron deﬁciency is causing serious 
damage to social and economic 
development through poorer pregnancy 
outcomes, impaired cognition especially 
in young children, reduced work capacity 
and increased morbidity from infectious 
diseases;
that zinc deﬁciency is associated with 
lowered immunity, slower growth and 
increased risk of heavy metal poisoning in 
contaminated environments;
that folic acid deﬁciency in women 
who become pregnant contributes to 
congenital abnormalities of the central 
nervous system of the newborn and is an 
independent risk factor for coronary heart 
disease; and 
that the key B-vitamins thiamin, 
riboﬂavin and niacin are removed during 
milling along with most iron and folic 
acid contributing to micronutrient 
malnutrition among populations whose 
diets are heavily dependent on bread and 
other ﬂour-based foods. 
• We afﬁrm:
that the addition of potassium iodate to 
all salt sold for human nutrition is a well 
established method for eliminating iodine 
deﬁciency as a societal problem;
that the KAP Komplex formula, developed 
by the Kazakh Academy of Nutrition 
for Central Asia, is an appropriate and 
safe basis for wheat ﬂour fortiﬁcation in 
the populations of the region to prevent 
deﬁciencies of thiamin, riboﬂavin, niacin 
and folic acid and reduce iron and zinc 
deﬁciency. This formula is freely available 
to any enrichment mix producer; 
that people of the region should have access 
to affordable, safe, and efﬁcacious fortiﬁed 
foods as a permanent commitment 
to the elimination of micronutrient 
malnutrition; 
that there are no capacity constraints for 
private producers to achieve signiﬁcant 
progress in providing affordable fortiﬁed 
salt and ﬂour to consumers in the 
region;
that the consequences of not implementing 
fortiﬁcation programs at national level will 
be poor child development, low educational 
achievement of children, and decreased 
earnings and economic growth; and
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that the initiative, supported by the 
Japan Fund, will contribute to fulﬁlling 
commitments made by the participating 
governments to universal protection of 
children.
• Therefore, we pledge:
that all salt for human consumption will 
be fortiﬁed with potassium iodate and to 
the maximum extent achievable wheat 
ﬂour will be fortiﬁed with micronutrients 
using the KAP Komplex formula.
• This will require:
that food laws and regulations be reviewed 
and amended to ensure they support 
and enable the addition of all essential 
micronutrients in appropriate food carriers;
that public policies and regulations that 
constrain or impede investment in food 
fortiﬁcation to reduce micronutrient 
malnutrition be reviewed and amended 
and that all nations collaborate to produce 
uniform or consistent standards based 
on international best practices that will 
smooth the trading of foods; 
that customs protocols and trade 
regulations will be revised or enacted to 
ensure the import and export of certiﬁed 
and safe fortiﬁed foods at agreed levels of 
fortiﬁcants;
that the cost of food fortiﬁcation must 
ultimately be borne by the producer and 
the consumer, but a transition period 
of cost-sharing between the public and 
private sectors may be necessary; 
that efforts be continued to inform the 
public of the beneﬁts of fortiﬁed salt 
and ﬂour to the learning and earning 
capacities of the region’s children and that 
the interests of NGOs, especially women’s 
federations and consumers’ rights unions, 
be fully included in future activities jointly 
conducted by the nations; and 
that food fortiﬁcation must be a part 
of a comprehensive strategy of anemia 
prevention and control that includes 
supplementation, dietary diversiﬁcation, 
breastfeeding promotion and other public 
health measures.
National Actions
National actions to achieve this will require the 
following coordinated actions at national, oblast 
and local levels:
Pass and effectively implement mandatory 
salt iodization laws in all countries and 
move forward the consideration of ﬂour 
fortiﬁcation laws in a timely fashion.
Urge the elimination of tariffs and value-
added taxes on inputs to fortiﬁcation 
and fortiﬁed food products, imported 
or domestically processed, to promote 
sustainability.
Avoid excessive price increases for fortiﬁed 
products that may discourage consumer 
preference.
Initiate cost-sharing by public and private 
sectors of the costs of producing fortiﬁed 
salt and ﬂour and strengthen the capacity 
of the private sector to be fully self-reliant 
shortly after the Japan Fund project 
completion.
Establish a monitoring framework to 
assess progress in the percent of salt and 
wheat ﬂour fortiﬁed during production 
and families with access to fortiﬁed food 
products.
Integrate fortiﬁcation programs into 
national strategies and policies to reduce 
poverty, raise the quality of human 
resources and support the survival, growth, 
psychosocial and cognitive development of 
all children, especially those of early ages.
Promote an expanded public sector-private 
sector dialogue on fortiﬁcation of salt and 
cereal ﬂour and organize advocacy events 
to increase program and donor support.
Develop and implement a communication 
strategy and campaign to raise public 
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awareness and improve the child caring 
skills of parents on the importance of 
fortiﬁed salt, wheat ﬂour and wheat ﬂour 
products and promote increased consumer 
demand for these products. These 
activities will be led by non-governmental 
organizations in collaboration with the 
private sector, national experts, the media, 
local authorities and communities.
Promote mechanisms to exchange 
information and experiences within and 
across the countries of the project using 
the world wide web and other modern 
communication tools. 
Obtain, update and disseminate 
information on the prevalence of 
micronutrient deﬁciencies by including 
micronutrient-related data collection 
into Demographic and Health Surveys, 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and 
other nutrition, health and education 
surveys.
Regional Actions 
Develop a framework for drafting 
and proposing harmonized regional 
and international trade standards and 
guidelines for fortiﬁed foods.
Develop regional activities such as 
roundtables, joint reports and cross 
country training focusing on legislation, 
communication strategies and partnerships 
among the civil society and private and 
public sectors.
Demonstrate through regional policy 
dialogue to economic planning agencies 
and the general public the large economic 
damage caused by poor nutrition and the 
proven low-cost solutions available to the 
region.
Advocate resource mobilization by 
governments from domestic budgets, 
public and private, and strategic 
investments from development partners, 
and share country experience in regional 
forums. 
Review and recommend ﬁnancial and 
capacity building incentives to sustain 
food fortiﬁcation and its expansion to 
other essential foods widely consumed by 
the poor.
Set up sentinel sites in at least three 
project countries to monitor progress of 
continuing efforts to fortify all salt and 
wheat ﬂour. 
Create communication mechanisms, 
including a web site, that allow project 
countries to share advocacy, technical and 
promotional activities among themselves 
and with the global community. 
Include micronutrient malnutrition 
issues into the agenda of regional expert 
group consultations such as associations 
of pediatricians, nutritionists and 
reproductive health specialists.
Prepare progress reports toward elimination 
of micronutrient malnutrition to the 
Regional Health Ministers Council.
APPENDIX 3
Regional Workshops under the Initiative
Project Management Training and Communication 
Strategy for Food Fortiﬁcation; held in Bishkek, 
Kyrgyz Republic; 4–7 March 2002.
Quality Assurance and Control, Regulations, and 
Standards; held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; 19–21 
June 2002.
Wheat Flour Fortiﬁcation and Midterm Review; 
held in Astana, Kazakhstan; 1–3 October 2002.
Policies on Food Fortiﬁcation, Monitoring, and 
Evaluation; held in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic; 7–9 
April 2003.
Regional Information Meeting on Communication 
Strategy and Project Management; held in Bishkek, 
Kyrgyz Republic; 22–24 August 2005. 
Second Conference of Salt Producers on Sustainable 
Quality Iodization in Central Asia and Mongolia; 
held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; 22–24 November 
2005. 
Regional Conference on Quality Wheat Flour 
Fortiﬁcation in Central Asia and Mongolia; held in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan; 7–9 February 2006. 
Regional Midterm Review Workshop; held in 
Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyz Republic; 11–14 September 
2006. 
APPENDIX 4
Performance Indicators of the Japan Fund  
for Poverty Reduction Projects
First Japan Fund for Poverty  
Reduction Project
There were only two performance indicators in 
the ﬁrst Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) 
project document. At an early stage of the project, 
targets of 66% of salt to be iodized, and 33% of ﬂour 
to be fortiﬁed, were set, although without a sound 
analysis, and the target set for ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
was unrealistic. The ﬁnal set of indicators was 
as follows:
• Reduction of iron deﬁciency anemia (IDA) and 
iodine deﬁciency disorders (IDD) prevalence.
• 66% consumption of iodized salt by the end of 
project.
• 33% consumption of fortiﬁed ﬂour by the end 
of project.
• Regulations on assuring quality of fortiﬁed 
foods.
• Passage of universal salt iodization legislation 
before 31 December 2002.
• Formal consideration of universal ﬂour 
fortiﬁcation in parliamentary committee or the 
equivalent before the end of the project.
Second Japan Fund for Poverty  
Reduction Project
• Increased use of iodized salt to 90% of 
households.
• Permanent sustainable system to procure annual 
requirements of potassium iodate established in 
each country.
• Increased fortiﬁed commercial wheat ﬂour 
production to country-speciﬁc targets.
• National premix procurement and/or production 
systems established.
• Regulations and/or legislation to promote 
universal ﬂour fortiﬁcation in each country.
• Establishment of trade regulations supporting 
regional trade of fortiﬁed ﬂour and iodized 
salt.
APPENDIX 5
Legislation and Regulations on Food Fortiﬁcation 
in Central Asian Countries
Legislation and Regulations on Salt 
Iodization 
Main Acts
2000 • The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Prevention of the Iodine Deﬁciency 
Disorders (18 January 2000, ref. 
no. 40)
2001 • The Agreement on Iodine Deﬁciency 
Status Prevention Among the Popu-
lation of the CIS States Members 
(Minsk, 31 May 2001)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Preven-
tion of the Iodine Deﬁciency Disor-
ders Among the Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in 2002–2005 
(5 October 2001, ref. no. 1283)
2002 • The Decree of the Government of 
Mongolia About the National Pro-
gram on Prevention of the Iodine De-
ﬁciency Disorders (1 May 2002)
• The Decree of the President of 
Mongolia on Establishment of the 
Working Group on Design of the 
Law on Salt Iodization and Iodine 
Deﬁciency Prevention (20 November 
2002)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Republic of Tajikistan on Adoption 
of the Strategy of the Health Care of 
the Population within the Period up to 
the Year 2010 (5 November 2002, ref. 
no. 436, section I, p.20)
• The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan 
on Salt Iodization (2 December 2002, 
ref. no. 85)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic About the National 
Program on Decrease of the Iodine 
Deﬁciency Disorders in the Kyrgyz 
Republic within the Period of 
2003–2007 (9 December 2002, ref. 
no. 836)
2003 • The Law of Mongolia on Salt Iodiza-
tion and Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders 
Prevention (10 October 2003)
• The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
on Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders Pre-
vention (14 October 2003, ref. 
no. 489–II)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic About the Concept 
of the National Policy on Healthy 
Nutrition (19 December 2003, ref. 
no. 785)
2005 • The Decree of the Government of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan About 
the National Program on Prevention 
of the Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders 
among the Population of Uzbekistan 
(26 September 2005, ref. no. 07-1-198)
2007 • The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
On Iodine Deﬁciency Disorders 
Prevention (3 May 2007, ref. 
no. ZRU-97)
• The Decree of the Government of 
Mongolia About the National Pro-
gram on the Prevention of the Iodine 
Deﬁciency Disorders 4 April 2007, 
ref. no. 85)
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Facilitation of the Production and Trade  
of the Iodized Salt
2002 • The Decree of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on Procurement of 
Food and Agricultural Products for the 
Needs of the Ministries, Governmental 
Agencies, Public Institutions and Other 
Organizations to be Funded from the 
National Budget (Nutrition Account) 
(18 July 2002, ref. no. 478)
2004 • Monitoring Procedures on the Qual-
ity, Production, Storage, Import, Ex-
port and Sale of the Iodized Salt and 
Other Iodized Food Products (the 
Decree of the Ministry of Health of 
Kazakhstan, 18 August 2004, ref. 
no. 641)
2005 • The Decree of the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Adoption 
of the Classiﬁcation of Commodities 
and Services (share in percentage) to 
be Procured by the Public Funds from 
the Small-Scale Business Companies in 
2005 (11 August 2005, ref. no. 828)
• The Order of the Board of the Min-
istry of Health of Tajikistan on Man-
datory Procurement of the Fortiﬁed 
Food Products for the Needs of the 
Hospitals (29 September 2005, ref. 
no. 9-2, section 6)
2006 • The Order of the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Science and Youth Policy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on Mandatory Use of 
the Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour and Iodized 
Salt in Schools’ Catering Services 
(25 January 2006, ref. no. 42/1, item 2.2)
Tax and Tariffs Privileges
2003 • The Decree of the Government of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan on Rates 
of Customs Taxes on Imported Com-
modities (14 November 1996, ref. 
no. 1389, revised in 2004): inclusion 
of the potassium iodide/iodate in the 
list of the medical drugs and substances 
to be eliminated from taxes and VAT
• The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Amendments to the Tax Code of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (20 January 2003): 
elimination of the vitamin and min-
eral additives from VAT
2004 • Customs Code of the Kyrgyz 
Republic (13 April 2004): elimination 
of the customs taxes on the imported 
equipment and spare parts (which 
cannot be produced domestically) and 
medicament substances (including 
vitamin and mineral additives)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on The Basic List of 
the Production Equipment to be the 
Subject of VAT Elimination when 
Importing to the Kyrgyz Republic 
(27 May 2004, ref. no. 391): elimi-
nation of taxes for food fortiﬁcation 
equipment (classiﬁcation code TN 
VED 8437)
2006 • The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Amendments to the Tax Code of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (1 February 2006, 
article 148): elimination of the VAT 
on imported main production equip-
ment
• The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Customs Code of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(29 March 2006): elimination of 
taxes on the equipment and spare parts 
which are not produced domestically; 
vitamin and mineral additives: group 
30, code of goods 3003 90 900 9; 
“zero tax rate” on the import and ex-
port of the iodized salt: group 25, code 
of goods 2501 00 911 0
2007 • The Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan on The 
Additional Activities to Motivate 
Modernization, Technical and Tech-
nology Re-equipment of industries 
(14 March 2007, ref. no. 3860): 
elimination of taxes for production 
equipment
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Monitoring of Import, Export, and Sale
2002 • The Decree of the President of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on Strengthening of 
the State Monitoring and Control on 
the Production, Import, Storage and 
Sale of Salt in the Kyrgyz Republic 
(11 July 2002, ref. no. 184)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on Implementation 
of the Decree of the President of the 
Kyrgyz Republic and On Strengthen-
ing of the State Monitoring and Con-
trol on the Production, Import, Storage 
and Sale of Salt in the Kyrgyz Republic 
(from 11 July 2002, ref. no. 184) 
(9 December 2002, ref. no. 836)
2005 • The Guidelines on Quality Control on 
the Fortiﬁed Food Products: the Joint 
Decree of the State Agency of the Pro-
fessional Control of Mongolia, Minis-
try of Health of Mongolia and Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture of Mongolia 
(9 June 2005, ref. no. 84/143/87)
Standards and Speciﬁcations on Salt 
Iodization
Potassium Iodate/Iodide
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
• Reagents. Potassium iodide. Speciﬁcations: 
GOST 4232-74 (State Committee of the USSR 
on Standards, entered into force from 1 July 
1975, amended 28.09.1984 and 11.12.1989)
• Reagents. Potassium iodate. Speciﬁcations: 
GOST 4202-75 (State Committee of the 
USSR on Standards, entered into force from 
1 January 1977, amended 17.06.1991)
Production of Iodized Salt
Kazakhstan 
• Food common salt with content of iodine. 
Speciﬁcations: TU 640 PK 197900772 
AO KHK -01-96 (27 September 1996, ref. 
no. 116/004492)
• Food common salt. Speciﬁcations: ST RK GOST 
R 51574-2003 (Committee on Standardization, 
Metrology and Certiﬁcation under the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade, 31 October 2003, ref. 
no. 377)
Kyrgyz Republic 
• Food common salt. Speciﬁcations: GOST R 
51574-2000 (State Inspection on Standardiza-
tion and Metrology, 10 September 2001, ref. 
no. 94-ST)
Mongolia
• Food natural common salt with content of 
iodine: MNS 5046:2001 (National Centre on 
Standardization and Metrology, 31 May 2001, 
ref. no. 33)
Tajikistan
• Food common salt: GOST 1060-04 (Agency 
on Standardization, Metrology, Certiﬁcation 
and Trade Inspection, 5 March 2004, ref. 
no. 48-ST)
• Food common salt with content of iodine: 
GOST R 51575-2004 (Agency on Standard-
ization, Metrology, Certiﬁcation and Trade 
Inspection, 5 March 2004, ref. no. 48-ST)
Uzbekistan
• Food common salt with content of iodine. 
Speciﬁcations: O’z DSt 1091:2005 (Agency on 
Standardization, Metrology and Certiﬁcation, 
26 September 2005, ref. no. 05-30)
Quality Assurance and Control  
at Industrial Sites
Kazakhstan
• Food common salt. Testing methods: GOST 
13685-84 (State Committee of the USSR on 
Standards, entered into force from 1 January 
1985, amended 11.12.1985 and 06.04.1987)
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• Food common salt with content of iodine. 
Methods of determination of iodine and 
sodium thiosulfate: ST RK GOST R 51575-
2003 (Committee on Standardization, 
Metrology and Certiﬁcation under the Minis-
try of Industry and Trade, 31 October 2003, 
ref. no. 377)
• Regulations on monitoring procedures on qual-
ity, processing, storage, import, and sale of the 
iodized table salt and other food products with 
content of iodine (Order of the Ministry of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 18 August 2004, ref. 
no. 641)
Kyrgyz Republic 
• Food common salt. Testing methods: GOST 
13685-84 (State Committee of the USSR on 
Standards, entered into force from 1 January 
1985, amended 11.12.1985 and 06.04.1987)
• Food common salt with content of iodine. 
Methods of determination of iodine and sodi-
um thiosulfate: ST RK GOST R 51575-2000 
(State Inspection on Standardization and 
Metrology, 10 September 2001, ref. 
no. 94-ST)
• Food common salt with content of iodine. 
Requirements on processing, import, transpor-
tation, storage, and sale: Sanitary Regulations 
and Norms (SP 2.3.4.006-04, 12 November 
2004, ref. no. 141-04)
Mongolia
• Methods of determination of iodine in iodized 
salt and drinking water: MNS 4260:95 (Nation-
al Centre on Standardization and Metrology, 
15 November 1995, ref. no. 14)
• Food natural common salt with content of io-
dine: MNS 5046:2001 (National Centre on 
Standardization and Metrology, 31 May 2001, 
ref. no. 33)
• Determination of iodine mass faction in 
iodized salt: MNS 5168:2002 (National 
Centre on Standardization and Metrology, 
29 August 2002, ref. no. 30)
Tajikistan
• Food common salt with content of iodine: 
GOST R 51575-2004 (Agency on Standard-
ization, Metrology, Certiﬁcation and Trade 
Inspection, 5 March 2004, ref. no. 48-ST)
Uzbekistan
• Food common salt. Testing methods: GOST 
13685-84 (State Committee of the USSR on 
Standards, entered into force from 1 January 
1985, amended 11.12.1985 and 06.04.1987)
• Sanitary regulations and hygienic norms on 
processing and quality of the table salt (SP 
0085-98, 5 November 1998; amendment 1, 
20 December 2002)
Legislation and Regulations on Flour 
Fortiﬁcation
Main Acts
• The Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic on Adoption of the List of the Flour 
Mills to be Engaged in the Wheat Flour For-
tiﬁcation, Use of Wheat Grain from the State 
Reserve Stocks and Mandatory Procurement of 
the Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour by the Public Institu-
tions (3 June 2002, ref. no. 89-r, items 5-6)
• The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
Food Security and Safety (8 April 2004, ref. 
no. 543): Article 11 on mandatory wheat ﬂour 
fortiﬁcation
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on the Regulations 
on Mandatory Fortiﬁcation of the Premium 
and First Grade Wheat Flour produced in 
Kazakhstan (7 July 2005, ref. no. 708)
• The Decree of the President of Uzbekistan on 
Implementation of the National Wheat Flour 
Fortiﬁcation Program (11 August 2005, ref. 
no. 153)
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Facilitation of the Production and Trade of 
the Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour
2005 • The Decree of the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Adoption 
of the Classiﬁcation of Commodities 
and Services (share in percentage) to 
be Procured by the Public Funds from 
the Small-Scale Business Companies in 
2005 (11 August 2005, ref. no. 828)
• The Order of the Board of the Min-
istry of Health of Tajikistan on Man-
datory Procurement of the Fortiﬁed 
Food Products for the Needs of the 
Hospitals (29 September 2005, ref. 
no. 9-2, section 6)
2006 • The Order of the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Science and Youth Policy of 
the Kyrgyz Republic on Mandatory 
Use of the Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour and 
Iodized Salt in Schools’ Catering Ser-
vices (25 January 2006, ref. no. 42/1, 
item 2.2)
Tax and Tariffs Privileges
2003 • The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Amendments to the Tax Code of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (20 January 2003): 
elimination of the vitamin and min-
eral additives from VAT
2004 • The Decree of the Government of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan on Rates 
of Customs Taxes on Imported Com-
modities (14 November 1996, ref. no. 
1389, revised in 2004): inclusion of 
the potassium iodide/iodate in the list 
of the medical drugs and substances to 
be eliminated from taxes and VAT
• Customs Code of the Kyrgyz 
Republic (13 April 2004): elimination 
of the customs taxes on the imported 
equipment and spare parts (which 
cannot be produced domestically) and 
medicament substances (including 
vitamin and mineral additives)
• The Decree of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on The Basic List of 
the Production Equipment to be the 
Subject of VAT Elimination when 
Importing to the Kyrgyz Republic 
(27 May 2004, ref. no. 391): elimi-
nation of taxes for food fortiﬁcation 
equipment (classiﬁcation code TN 
VED 8437)
2006 • The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Amendments to the Tax Code of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (1 February 2006, 
article 148): elimination of the VAT 
on imported main production equip-
ment
• The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Customs Code of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(29 March 2006): elimination of tax-
es on the equipment and spare parts 
which are not produced domestically; 
vitamin and mineral additives: group 
30, code of goods 3003 90 900 9; zero 
tax rate on the import and export of 
the iodized salt: group 25, code of 
goods 2501 00 911 0
• The Law of Mongolia on Import Taxes 
and VAT: amendment on elimination 
of customs tax and VAT on imported 
wheat grain and wheat ﬂour (29 June 
2006)
2007 • The Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan on The 
Additional Activities to Motivate Mod-
ernization, Technical and Technology 
Reequipment of Industries (14 March 
2007, ref. no. 3860): elimination of 
taxes for production equipment
Monitoring of Import, Export, and Sale
2005 • The Guidelines on Quality Control 
on the Fortiﬁed Food Products: the 
Joint Decree of the State Agency of 
the Professional Control of Mongolia, 
Ministry of Health of Mongolia, 
and Ministry of Food and Agricul-
ture of Mongolia (9 June 2005, ref. 
no. 84/143/87)
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• The Order of the Ministry of Health 
of Kazakhstan on Quality Control on 
Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour Production and 
Utilization of Premix (29 December 
2005, ref. no. 07-21-15269)
2006 • The Guidelines on Quality Control 
on the Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour: the 
Joint Decree of the State Agency of 
the Professional Control of Mongolia, 
Ministry of Health of Mongolia, and 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture of 
Mongolia (1 December 2006, ref. 
no. 140/390/121)
2008 • The Guidelines on Enrichment (For-
tiﬁcation) of the Food Products in 
Regard to the Sanitary and Epide-
miologic Surveillance: the Decree 
of the Government of Kazakhstan 
(19 January 2008, ref. no. 32)
Standards and Speciﬁcations on Flour 
Fortiﬁcation
Premix
Kazakhstan
• Vitamin and mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: 
TU 70 00 RK 39309831-ZAO-025-2002 
(Committee on Standardization, Metrol-
ogy and Certiﬁcation under the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade, 1 March 2002, ref. 
no. 022/001453)
• Vitamin and mineral additive KAP Komplex 
1: ST TOO 40261271-01-2006 (Standard of 
industry, 27 April 2006, ref. no. 0013)
Kyrgyz Republic
• Vitamin and mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: 
TU 9352 PT 020007157 001-2002 (Technical 
Committee 09 Grain and its processing prod-
ucts, 20 January 2004)
Mongolia
• Vitamin and mineral additive KAP Komplex 
1: MNS 5154:2002 (National Centre on 
Standardization and Metrology, 30 May 2002, 
ref. no. 26, MNS 5154:2003 amended on 1 May 
2003, ref. no. 12)
Tajikistan
• Vitamin and mineral additive KAP Komplex 
1. Speciﬁcations: TU 9352 RT 020007157 
001-2002 (Agency on Standardization, 
Metrology, Certiﬁcation and Trade Inspection, 
7 January 2003)
Uzbekistan
• Vitamin and mineral additive for enrichment of 
the baking wheat ﬂour. General speciﬁcations: 
O’z DSt 1098:2006 (Agency on Standardiza-
tion, Metrology and Certiﬁcation, 6 March 
2006, ref. no. 05-07)
Production of Fortiﬁed Wheat Flour
Kazakhstan
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vita-
min and mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: 
TU 70 00 RK 39309831-ZAO-026-2002 
(Committee on Standardization, Metrol-
ogy and Certiﬁcation under the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade, 1 March 2002, ref. 
no. 022/001453)
• Wheat ﬂour. General speciﬁcations: ST RK 
1482-2005 (Committee on Standardization, 
Metrology and Certiﬁcation under the Minis-
try of Industry and Trade, 28 December 2005, 
ref. no. 498)
• Wheat ﬂour enriched with the vitamin and 
mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: ST TOO 
40261271-02-2006 (Standard of industry, 
27 April 2006, ref. no. 0014)
Kyrgyz Republic 
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vitamin-
mineral or mineral additive: TU 9293-002-
05712834-2002 (State Inspection on Stan-
dardization and Metrology, 16 May 2002, ref. 
no. 146/490544)
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vitamin-
mineral or mineral additive: KMS 918:2004 
(State Inspection on Standardization and 
Metrology, 6 February 2004, ref. no. 9-ST)
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• Wheat common ﬂour. General speciﬁcations: 
KMS 990:2005 (National Institute of Stan-
dards and Metrology, 30 December 2005, ref. 
no. 105-ST)
Mongolia
• Wheat ﬂour enriched with the vitamin and 
mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: MNS 
5156:2002 (National Centre on Standardiza-
tion and Metrology, 30 May 2002, ref. no. 26, 
MNS 5156:2003 amended on 1 May 2003, 
ref. no. 12). Amendment from 21 December 
2006, ref. no. 47 indicated the requirement of 
use of Healthy Food logo.
Tajikistan
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vitamin-
mineral additive (premix). Speciﬁcations: ST 
RT 1057-2004 (Agency on Standardization, 
Metrology, Certiﬁcation and Trade Inspection, 
14 January 2004, ref. no. 47-ST)
Uzbekistan
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the 
vitamin-mineral additive KAP Komplex 1. 
Speciﬁcations: Tsh 8-178-2002 (Agency on 
Standardization, Metrology and Certiﬁcation, 
23 September 2002, ref. no. 112/004792, 
amended 10.10.2005 ref. no. 112004792/01)
• Technological instruction on processing of 
wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vitamin-
mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: TIUz 8-215-
2003 (Technical Committee Bread and Bakery, 
Uzkhleboproduct Ltd., 14 March 2003)
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vitamin-
mineral additive KAP Komplex 1. Speciﬁca-
tions: O’z DSt 1098:2006 (Agency on Stan-
dardization, Metrology and Certiﬁcation, 10 
April 2006, ref. no. 05-10)
Bread and Bakery Production with Fortiﬁed 
Wheat Flour
Kazakhstan
• Bread and bakery enriched with the vitamin and 
mineral additive KAP Komplex 1: TU 70 00 
RK 39309831-ZAO-028-2002 (Committee 
on Standardization, Metrology and Certiﬁca-
tion under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
18 September 2002, ref. no. 022/001643)
• Standard of industry: Bread and bakery with 
fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour: ST TOO 40261271-07-
2006 (17 May 2006, ref. no. 0103)
Kyrgyz Republic
• Bakery with fortiﬁed wheat ﬂour enriched with 
the vitamin-mineral, protein, and other food 
additives: KMS 922:2004 (National Institute 
of Standards and Metrology, 23 December 
2004, ref. no. 39-ST)
Mongolia
• Bread and bakery with wheat ﬂour enriched 
with the vitamin and mineral additive KAP 
Komplex 1: MNS 5384:2004 (National 
Centre on Standardization and Metrology, 
1 December 2004, ref. no. 38)
Tajikistan
• Bread and bakery with ﬂour enriched with the 
vitamin-mineral additive (premix). Speciﬁca-
tions: ST RT 1058-2004 (Agency on Standard-
ization, Metrology, Certiﬁcation and Trade 
Inspection, 14 January 2004, ref. no. 47-ST)
Quality Assurance and Control at  
Industrial Sites 
Kyrgyz Republic 
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vita-
min-mineral or mineral additive: TU 9293-
002-05712834-2002 (State Inspection on 
Standardization and Metrology, 16 May 2002, 
ref. no. 146/490544)
• Wheat baking ﬂour enriched with the vitamin-
mineral or mineral additive: KMS 918:2004 
(State Inspection on Standardization and 
Metrology, 6 February 2004, ref. no. 9-ST)
Mongolia
• Methods of test of vitamin and mineral additive 
KAP Komplex 1: MNS 5155:2002 (National 
Centre on Standardization and Metrology, 
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30 May 2002, ref. no. 26, amended on 7 July 
2003, ref. no. 31)
• Methods of test of wheat ﬂour enriched with 
the vitamin and mineral additive KAP Komplex 
1: MNS 5157:2002 (National Centre on 
Standardization and Metrology, 30 May 2002, 
ref. no. 26, MNS 5157:2003 amended on 7 July 
2003, ref. no. 31)
Uzbekistan
• Methods of test of Vitamin B fraction: O’z 
DSt 1095:2006 (Agency on Standardization, 
Metrology and Certiﬁcation, 10 April 2006, 
ref. no. 05-10)
APPENDIX 6
Declaration of the Third Almaty Forum, 2007
Making Food Fortiﬁcation  
Sustainable
29–30 October 2007, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Declaration
1. In 2001, four Central Asian countries – 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan—and Mongolia embarked on a set 
of ambitious national goals to ensure access to 
affordable, safe, and efﬁcacious fortiﬁed food as a 
permanent commitment to eliminate micronutrient 
deﬁciencies in their populations, and the Asian 
Development Bank, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund, and the Kazakh Academy of Nutrition, 
funded by the Government of Japan through the 
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction started close 
collaboration in support of these goals.
2. At the Almaty Forum 2001, multisector 
delegations led by high-level ministerial ofﬁcials 
promised to work together to fortify all salt for 
human consumption with potassium iodate and 
fortify wheat ﬂour to the maximum achievable 
extent with micronutrients using the KAP complex 
formula. A regional roundtable reviewed the progress 
being made toward these pledges at the Almaty 
Forum 2004 and agreed to a detailed work plan 
to tackle the immediate shortfalls. In recognition 
that universal salt iodization and mandatory 
fortiﬁcation contribute to sustainable elimination of 
micronutrient deﬁciencies, multisector delegations 
from the participating countries have once again 
gathered at the Almaty Forum 2007 to take stock of 
the achievements, to analyze the challenges that are 
still remaining, and pledge to complete the national 
fortiﬁcation agendas.
3. A signiﬁcant progress has been made in increasing 
the production, sales, and consumption of quality 
iodized salt guided adoption and implementation 
of appropriate legal frameworks. Flour fortiﬁcation 
also has been steadily expanding, but still lacks legal 
and regulatory frameworks to provide a level playing 
ﬁeld for all mills. 
4. On the basis of national and regional experience 
and lessons learned during the last six years we 
recognize that:
(i) In many countries of the region, the nutrition 
status of many women and children continues 
to be poor with negative health consequences 
for children, families, and constraining 
economic and social development; 
(ii) Iodine deﬁciency in pregnancy permanently 
damages the learning capacity of children; 
(iii) Iron deﬁciency causes serious damages 
including poorer pregnancy outcomes, 
permanent impairment of cognition in early 
childhood; poor school performance of 
children and teenagers; reduced work capacity 
among adults, and increased morbidity 
from infectious diseases and increased risk 
of heavy metal poisoning in contaminated 
environments; 
(iv) Zinc deﬁciency is associated with lowered 
immunity to infectious disease, slower child 
growth; 
(v) Folic acid deﬁciency in women, who 
become pregnant, contributes to congenital 
abnormalities of the central nervous system of 
the newborn and is an independent risk factor 
for coronary heart disease; 
(vi) The key B-vitamins, thiamin, riboﬂavin, and 
niacin are removed from wheat during ﬂour 
milling along with most iron and folic acid. 
This contributes to micronutrient malnutrition 
among populations who consume large amounts 
of bread and other ﬂour-based foods; 
(vii) Given the seriousness of the health effects of 
these micronutrient deﬁciencies, they must be 
eliminated as a public health problem.
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5. This roundtable strongly reafﬁrms the goals of 
appropriate universal fortiﬁcation of salt and wheat 
ﬂours.
6. Recognizing that the progress will vary among 
countries and between salt and wheat, it will be 
necessary to use country speciﬁc interim benchmarks 
to measure progress toward these goals. Goals 
and benchmarks are essential and must be used to 
accelerate progress toward these goals.
Essential Recommended Actions at the 
National Level
(i) All countries will anchor food fortiﬁcation 
strategies as an integral part of their national 
development plans and national budget to 
ensure sustained commitment at the highest 
political level.
(ii) All countries will strengthen an effective 
national alliance for salt and ﬂour fortiﬁcation 
among government, industry, academia, and 
producers.
(iii) All countries will complete the legislation and 
regulations requiring ﬂour fortiﬁcation.
(iv) The Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan will complete the establishment 
of an effective and high quality system for 
quality control and assurance of fortiﬁed salt 
and ﬂour.
(v) All countries will ensure that imported 
fortiﬁed foods meet national standards.
(vi) All countries will remove barriers to 
procurement of fortiﬁcants and equipment 
for fortiﬁcation recognizing achievements of 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
(vii) All countries will assure that the importance 
and safety of consuming fortiﬁed salt and 
wheat products is understood at all levels of 
society.
(viii) All countries will continue to strengthen 
inter-country collaboration through existing 
mechanisms of communication to make 
optimal use of expertise and experience, to 
harmonize standards, strengthen quality 
assurance, remove impediments to trade in 
fortiﬁed foods, and create economy of scale 
for food fortiﬁcation inputs such as premix.
(ix) All countries will ensure regular meetings 
to report on progress and renew political 
commitments to the food fortiﬁcation goals.
(x) All countries will establish a national fortiﬁed 
food surveillance system and report on 
fortiﬁed food supply, consumption, and 
biological outcome.
(xi) Governments and parliaments should 
set aside adequate funds in their central 
budgets to ﬁnance activities required for 
sustaining universal salt iodization and ﬂour 
fortiﬁcation
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